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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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17 DECEMBER 1986

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MAJ GEN AVN PAVLOV ON VALUE OF MILITARY PATRIOTIC EDUCATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 86 p 1

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Major General V. Pavlov: "A Readiness for Heroic Deeds"]

[Text] Major General Vitaliy Yegorovich Pavlov is a graduate of Syzranskiy Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni the 60th Anniversary of the USSR. He also flew there as an instructor. After completing the Military Air Academy imeni Yu. A. Gagarin, he returned there as a squadron commander. During his service in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan he was awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage, valor and military skill. He was made an honorary cadet in one of the training regiments by order of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He completed the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov that year. Major General Pavlov is now Deputy Air Force Commander for the Baltic Military District.

Lieutenant Colonel N. Polyanskiy who had distinguished himself while providing international assistance to our friend Afghanistan was once asked, "What helped you endure the difficult trials and guided you during the many times you went out to face risk?" I remember that the officer briefly answered, "I am a military man. That is the total answer."

A Dushman firing position was covering an important road that went through a ravine. The bandits had set up in a cave whose entrance was in a cliff. The Dushman could see the road as clearly as they could see the palms of their hands and it was impossible to reach them. The Dushman opened fire on everything that came into their sector of fire, regardless of whether it was a peaceful Afghan, an Afghan soldier, a vehicle or a helicopter.

Our Afghan comrades turned to us for help in destroying the firing position and this very risky assignment given to Lieutenant Colonel Polyanskiy. The problem was, what was the best way to accomplish this mission. It was not possible to destroy the Dushman from the flank, as they were holed up deep in a rock burrow, and a frontal attack would bring the attackers under fire

before they could aim their own weapons. Polyanskiy circled a few times, maneuvering prudently, drew some fire and looked closely before making his final decision: he would attack from a sharp bank. And that is what he did. The conditions were extremely difficult for aiming. There was the rocky ravine and the nearby cliff. And the helicopter was in a steep bank which forced it to keep up a high angular speed. Nonetheless Polyanskiy hit the target.

A heroic deed is not suddenly born. It is a manifestation of strength of character and is the result of persistent work. Skill is developed day after day, through intense military labor and this tempers the will and strengthens the arm. A readiness for battle and confidence in victory are born during the training week.

Yes, one can openly say that the very nature of service in the army and navy is such that at times it is difficult to distinguish between the heroism of daily work and the heroism of a selfless deed. The exercises and flights, ocean cruises and combat duty are filled with difficult situations which demand that people go to the limits of moral and physical intensity, courage and skill, military initiative and decisiveness. Army and navy service provides the best conditions for educating and manifesting courage and skill. I would say that the more intense combat training is and the more difficult trials under field conditions are, the sooner the character of a soldier is tempered. This has been tested by life and underscored by experience.

But a strong will in and of itself is not enough. The idea that a man has when he goes into danger and the idea that lives in his spirit are also important. There have been many times when I have watched how my subordinates were functioning under severe military conditions and have had sincere conversations with them and I have again and again come away convinced that a heroic deed grows out of a deep feeling of love for the Motherland, dedication to our society and our international duty and loyalty to the military oath.

I have said this and I recall how a group of helicopters were flying at an extremely low altitude when they came upon a ravine occupied by Dushman so suddenly that the helicopters were unable to fire a shot. After dropping off subunits from the Afghan Army, the helicopters had set off on a return course when they suddenly came under fire. Bullet holes appeared in the helicopters, but the ground fire was not causing any great danger so the aviators felt that the major danger was behind them. Suddenly air defense fire hit them at close range from the slope along which they were flying. The group commander's helicopter seemed to stumble and suddenly began to drop. Tracer fire began to hit it. The squadron deputy commander for political affairs, Major Aleksandr Sadokhin, resolutely threw his helicopter at full speed directly at the enemy ambush and fired a volley. Because of the shell bursts he was unable to see what he should have been watching, where and how the commander landed, so that he could hurry to assist him.

At that time another bandit machinegun struck from yet another ambush and rounds passed through the cabin. Sadokhin winced and began to fall. He did succeed in ordering his assistant to: "Save the commander."

Major Anatoliy Surtsukov's helicopter was nearby and he immediately went to help the commander. He first opened fire on the machinegun ambush and then dropped in steep spirals, took his comrades on board and took them to the airfield. That day Surtsukov went out a number of times under fire to help Afghan subunits. He wasn't flying because there were no other pilots available, but rather because he knew the situation in the area better than anyone else. Major A. Surtsukov was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner and is now a student at the Military Air Academy imeni Yu. A. Gagarin. He understood the danger he was subjecting himself to when he went out to rescue his comrades, but he didn't for a minute or an instant doubt the correctness of his actions in that dangerous situation. He could not have acted otherwise and his conscience would not have let him.

Every Soviet man is indoctrinated from childhood with a readiness for heroic deeds and his love for the Motherland is fed to him along with his mother's milk. This is what helps him overcome all difficulties and hardships. My heart holds the words of two-time Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Aviation I. N. Kozhedub that recently appeared in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "...it would have been impossible to defend our Soviet Motherland and her freedom and independence, defeat the hated enemy and gain victory without overcoming difficulties and hardship. Victory was the main thing. We fought the enemy not to life, but to the death for that. In the name of victory we withstood all hardships and difficulties. And it was precisely this that was the foundation for the unprecedented feat that the Soviet soldier accomplished during the Great Patriotic War."

Military traditions do not fade away. They are multiplied in the daily military work of soldiers and one of the clearest confirmations of this is the activity by Soviet soldiers in eliminating the aftereffects of the accident that occurred in the Chernobyl AES. I am proud that military aviators were among the first to join this fight against misfortune. I am proud that those who distinguished themselves in carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan and with whom I had occasion to fly through "fire and water" in the skies of that friendly country were examples of selflessness during that difficult test.

And who can not remember the words of that popular song from the pre-war years: "When the country tells us to become heroes, all of us will become a hero." That is how it was during the Civil War. This was manifested at an even greater level during the Great Patriotic War when the heroism of the Soviet people was so very massive both on the Front and in the rear area. It suffices to say that 110 people of various nationalities were awarded the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union for heroic deeds at the Battle of Moscow alone.

In taking the baton of courage and heroic deeds, we are deeply aware of our heroic responsibility for the fate of the world and of socialism.

We know with whom we are dealing, how insidious imperialism is and how dangerous its child, the military-industrial complex, is. Therefore, as noted in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev's 18 August 1986 statement, the security of the country is a sacred duty for us. A readiness for heroic deeds is natural for Soviet people. It has become an integral part of their way of thinking, their nature and their conduct. This must be clear to anyone who thinks about scaring us with a military threat and an arms race.

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

RESTRUCTURING: FULFILLMENT IN WORDS BUT NOT DEEDS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "I Reported It and Responsibility is Off My Shoulders, or, When People Try To Shift Responsibility To Others"]

[Text] This letter in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was devoted to the work restructuring that is now on-going. It grabbed the reader's attention with almost every line. The author, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kruk, anxiously advised us that, he said, his co-workers (and especially senior chiefs) were only good at talking about the concept of restructuring. And in fact the restructuring was moving ahead slowly. The reason for this was primarily that "the commander and chiefs were in no hurry to support restructuring and were only advocating it." And because of this, Lieutenant Colonel Kruk found the same shortcomings year after year, month after month in the service that he headed.

I note that the dominant idea in this letter was the idea that the shortcomings in Lieutenant Colonel Kruk's service were caused by the unit commander's so-called inability to organize. And this was the basis of his unfounded pretensions toward authorship. I spent a long time discussing this topic with Lieutenant Colonel Kruk. We studied the inspection documents and analyzed the shortcomings that were discovered and the reasons that caused them. And this is the conclusion that I reached: the primary guilty party in many of the shortcomings was Lieutenant Colonel Kruk himself. Here is one of many bits of evidence.

An authoritative committee discovered that soldiers in many of the subunits were unable to carry out their assigned military training missions at a high level because equipment mock-ups, reflectors and various simulators and other equipment had not been set up where they should have been. Lieutenant Colonel Kruk was the one responsible for setting up and maintaining all of this equipment. He was instructed to go out to the subunits prior to inspecting, study the state of affairs in his service there and, if necessary, take the appropriate measures. This did not require a lot of work, as he was to explain the mission to the commanders and monitor that it was accomplished.

However, despite the fact that many deficiencies were discovered, Lieutenant Colonel Kruk did nothing to eliminate them. Why? Aleksey Konstantinovich's

answer carefully avoided any mention of his own lack of execution. He again began to talk verbosely about the lack of command organization and exactingness. He said that nothing was organized in the subunits because the unit commander did not intervene. He, Lieutenant Colonel Kruk, immediately reported the deficiencies. The commander should have then exercised his authority.

"If he had rebuked the subunit commanders, they would have taken care of matters. And what happened! I had to get behind a tool myself and get the mock-ups set up," my conversation partner told me.

I listened to him and thought: is it possible that he has such a simple concept of his job or is he simply putting up a front? What happened is that the unit commander had to organize everything that the service chief had not set up. By the way, this was no novice, but rather an experienced, competent chief. The question is, why was he in such a responsible position.

The point in question is certainly not that Lieutenant Colonel Kruk took a hammer in hand and pounded nails. Rather it is a question of who should be responsible for the poor condition of the equipment and for mobilizing people to eliminate the deficiencies. This is his primary responsibility. And whom, if not him, does his service expect to teach and train subunit officers? This desire is what Aleksey Konstantinovich clearly lacks. What he does have is a constant desire to avoid personal responsibility and to justify himself with the phrase, "But I reported it!"

What a position. And neither the commander or fellow workers can do anything to convince him that a unit staff officer is not an impassive controller who only locates shortcomings, but rather an organizer and fighter for high combat readiness. Moreover, the on-going restructuring about which he so anxiously writes in his letter to the editor first and foremost supposes that every one of us works with all his effort within his assigned area of responsibility, shows initiative and creativity and does not allow any divergence between word and deed. A person must not wait until someone comes in and brings order to the area assigned him. It is your area of responsibility and restructuring must begin with you. By the way, the conscientious work of many of Lieutenant Colonel Kruk's co-workers testifies to the fact that they are accepting their part in the restructuring exactly as they should, with party responsibility. For example, the officers from adjacent services and his colleagues are not waiting for repetitive reminders and instructions from the commander and chief of staff, but are operating independently and according to the situation. They are not afraid to make critical decisions or demand what is necessary from people. Despite the assertions contained in the letter, they are looking for and finding newer and newer possibilities for increasing the quality of the training and educational process and for improving combat readiness in subunits and the unit as a whole not only in word, but in deed. By the way, the command exactingness which the letter's author advised us about was combined with other educational methods to help some officers avoid innertness and poor organization in their services.

At one time or another officers (A. Tkachenko and V. Kostylev were the targets of justified reproaches. They endured the severity of command reprimands, yet

they did not take offense, but rather came to the right conclusions from what took place. In particular, they began to show more initiative and independence in their work. For example, officer Kostylev showed a lot of effort and creative thinking in setting up a chemical village, equipping a special area and technically equipping classrooms. And Lieutenant Colonel A. Tkachenko as well as officers F. Ulibegov, V. Smyk, P. Petrenko and others also accomplished a lot of good things.

I would not be objective, however, if I said that there were no unresolved problems in the unit and that restructuring on the whole was going along smoothly. No, there is still a lot to do, for example, in the area of intensifying personnel training, strengthening military discipline and organizing competition. There are also some ragged edges in the commander's work. However, on the whole, this is not the same style that the commander had a year or two ago. The commander has revised many of his policies. In particular, he is more self-critical and attentive toward subordinates. But at the same time, he demands more of them. And as many of them explained in conversations with me, the overwhelming majority of the staff officers approve of this demand and have themselves become more demanding of themselves and of one another. They spoke honestly and with agitation about the fact that there were still problems in their work. Unfortunately, one cannot say this about Lieutenant Colonel Kruk, even by stretching the point. He is still willing to criticize other people for their shortcomings, but he takes criticism aimed at him as scandalous injustice. For example, the commander punished Aleksey Konstantinovich for not carrying out his duties and communists criticized him for the same thing and he immediately complained to higher authorities. And was the commander incorrect? No, he was right. So felt everyone in the headquarters, with the exception of Lieutenant Colonel Kruk himself.

And people have recently begun to discuss something else. Since they do not understand him, why does he have to serve in the position that he holds. But it would be no easier for Lieutenant Colonel Kruk in any other position, for the main reason for all of his misfortune is within himself. And it is a dangerous symptom to have someone severely criticize others, but not consider himself subject to either his own or the collective's judgment.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

OPEN LETTER TO THOSE WHO TRY TO SAVE SONS FROM MILITARY SERVICE

Vilnius KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 86 p 2

[Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Z. Vichis: "There Will Not Be Another!"]

[Text] Fall call-up for the Army is approaching. Once again there will be well-clipped young men, speeches, farewells and the brass of orchestras. The proud glances of parents whose sons are becoming soldiers. The brisk, clear song, "I serve where needed and I will return..."

But unfortunately there are mothers and, yes, fathers who try to keep their 18-year old "children" from the possible difficulties of army service.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Radzyavichyus, a military commissariat worker, looked at recruit A. Sakavichyus's documents and at the recruit and was surprised. How could he be suffering from ulcers, for he looked in the peak of health and had color in both cheeks. The officer contacted the hospital where A. Sakavichyus supposedly took his examination and it immediately became clear that he did not now, or ever, have an ulcer. The medical examination documents were a forgery.

The court spent a long time trying to find the answer as to what principles forced A. Sakavichyus to undertake this disgraceful affair and become "socially dangerous." The lad was given a two-year jail sentence. What will happen in his future after he has completed his punishment? And what should he have done to keep this from happening? He would have had to serve two years, grow up, got stronger and test himself in the real world.

Legal agencies got involved in the case of recruit A. Sakavichyus. But what about those telephone calls and visits to military commissariat workers from parents looking for a "warm" spot for their sons? What about their attacks on medical workers to get false references?

Do these "noble" parents not understand that by doing this they are teaching their sons the habit of taking and not giving anything in return. The law clearly states, "to execute and to serve." What is there to discuss here? There is the profession of defender of the Motherland. It is the sacred duty of every man and there cannot be any other variation.

O. Kushleykene, the mother of a young soldier, showed up one day at a voyenkomat [military registration and enlistment office] and began, "They said that my son would serve in the Baltic Military District, but they sent him to the Turkestan Military District."

The voyenkomat decided to investigate. They wrote the unit commander who answered, "In conversation with me Private Kushleyka stated that it was at the republic assembly point that he found out about the trouble his mother was causing workers at the Pozhelskiy RVK [rayon military commissariat] where he had been called up and he asked that he be sent to serve in Afghanistan."

Yu. Paulauskene from Mazheykyay said, "I lost my head when my only son received his call-up papers. I asked for assistance from people I know who work at the military commissariat, but they refused and my son became a soldier. How I suffered, especially those first weeks. And then my son recently came home on leave. It would take me a long time to tell you all the changes that had taken place, changes that a mother would be happy about, but I'll tell you only the major one that I liked: his judgment and his views on life had matured and therefore I would like to say to all mothers -- 'Don't "protect" your sons and don't cause them problems.'"

There is one more aspect to future service for the lads and that is the selection of their branch of service. There are certainly boys who from childhood dreamed about blue berets, the white canopy over them and super karate. But there are also construction troops in the army. Work is work, for two year, day after day. A mother rebuked military commissariat workers with, "What can he learn there, what kind of school of courage is this? Why was my son assigned to military construction?"

"I'm glad that I served in precisely these forces. What was I able to do before I served in the army? Basically nothing. And now I have mastered five specialties," the recently discharged soldier told her.

All mothers and fathers certainly want their son to end up in a good unit and in reliable, good hands so that he can master military affairs and serve well! But I want to remind these respected parents that their son's place of service and arm of service are not a matter of choice for the youth or for the parents. They do not have the right to choose these things. The son will be sent where a consideration of his abilities, education and health show that he will do the most good for the Motherland.

All the branches of service are necessary, important and difficult! There will be plenty of difficulties, trials and difficult men's work, whether you are an airborne trooper, a tanker or a construction worker. People must serve in all these locations! This is how it has always been and how it will be so long as our peaceful country needs an army. Otherwise what kind of citizen are you and what kind of son are you for the Motherland?!

And here is another thing I want to tell you, lads. It seems to me that some of you feel that you have only to endure and suffer through your years in the army! There is a joke that goes: a soldier sleeps, but the service goes on. Real life begins after the service. This is not true. The fact is that these

two years are extremely important. You must train yourself, your character and your will, develop the ability to live in a collective, get to know new people and gain comrades, possible even for the rest of of your life.

The words of Mikhail Sholokhov, "A love for the Motherland is kept in our hearts," expresses our patriotic feeling better than anything else. We drink this feeling along with our mother's milk and feel it with the first caress of our parent's hand. In order to totally master this sacred feeling, we must pass a severe and difficult examination in the school of courage, staunchly enduring every burden and difficulty, and must stand with weapons in hand and vigilantly protect the sacred boundaries of the Fatherland. The Motherland will never recognize as her son a person who is not able and, even worse, who does not want to defend her.

12511

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

RESTRUCTURING: INITIATIVE VS CONSERVATISM IN OFFICER ATTITUDES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Yurdanov, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, Red Banner Far East Military District, under the rubric "The Restructuring: It Depends Upon Everyone": "Do Everything Conscientiously"]

[Text] Restructuring.... This word has captured our minds and hearts. Naturally, everyone has questions about the ways and means of restructuring and the factors contributing to its success. "...Everyone must begin the restructuring, all of the work involved in the restructuring, with himself," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said in his speech at a conference of the aktiv of the Khabarovsk Kray party organization. "We need first to put it to ourselves, to set for ourselves first of all the task of doing everything conscientiously, with a great sense of responsibility to ourselves and to the people."

Begin with ourselves, set ourselves first of all the task.... The authors of the articles with which we are starting the column "The Restructuring: It Depends Upon Everyone" tell how these requirements are being implemented. We invite the readers to share their thoughts on these matters. Tell us about experience in the restructuring, about the people who are successfully carrying it out, those who know how to accept responsibility and convert the energy of thought into the energy of practical action. Tell us about the difficulties and the unresolved problems which are troubling you.

I would like to begin with an exercise recently conducted in our regiment. The concept basically followed the pattern of a battalion tactical exercise conducted more than once in the unit. The accustomed tactical setting was altered drastically, however, at the suggestion of Major S. Krutko, deputy unit commander. The officer insisted that the exercise of the battalion commanded by Major V. Kolpakov had to conform to the demands of actual combat, that the situation had to be intensified so as to make it truly complex. This involved "grabbing" the initiative away from the motorized riflemen with a sudden turn of events and forcing them to fight for it.

Far from everybody shared Major S. Krutko's opinion. People knew that representatives from higher headquarters were attending the exercise. Risk the good reputation of the regiment, when the tactical exercise with live firing could be executed like a familiar melody? We could even set an example for others.

Personally, however, I found the deputy's reasoning convincing. If the matter of the end results was to be made a matter of principle, then the exercise would have to be a real test for the fightingmen, would have to teach them that which is demanded in actual combat. There was another plus: any deficiencies would become obvious. It would immediately become clear what we needed to work on. In a word, Major Krutko's proposal was accepted. He personally led the group involved in working out the plan for the exercise. And here is what happened.

When the battalion had captured a highway intersection and no longer expected any resistance, the "enemy" attacked it on both flanks and began tightening a sort of pocket of fire. The situation demanded great skill from all of the subunit commanders and an all-out effort by all the personnel.

After regrouping and involving a mortar battery in suppressing the counterattacking "enemy," Major Kolpakov committed the second-echelon company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Shulema and the tanks in an attached subunit to the battle. The motorized riflemen regained the initiative.

This was not all there was to it, however. The exercise participants themselves later talked about how instructive it had been, about how they had gained valuable experience by passing the test. The experience from that exercise is being used in the preparation of others. The field training of all the regimental personnel has improved markedly, and the skill of the commanders has improved as a result.

In my view, this example convincingly shows how much the initiative and principle of even a single individual mean and how important it is for everyone to work with a sense of responsibility for the assigned job, for the end result. Probably no one would have reproached the deputy regimental commander if he had not insisted on complicating the situation. He followed his sense of duty and his conscience, however. It was more difficult in this exercise than it had been in the past, of course. That which is essential in combat can only be learned in this way, however, with great effort.

Officer V. Kudlay from higher headquarters, who has been awarded the Order of Lenin for fulfilling his international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, was working in the regiment one time. We were surprised by his conclusion that the fightingmen of certain subunits were in poor physical condition and had little stamina. The officer then suggested that one of the best companies, that commanded by Captain A. Lukyantsev, perform a firing exercise immediately following a march of many kilometers. The motorized riflemen performed the task with great difficulty.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Tugay, a battalion commander, derived a conclusion from this without waiting for instructions, as they say. He made corresponding adjustments in the combat training of subordinate subunits. The battalion began intensifying the drills and classes, to perform all exercises and meet all the norms in a complex tactical setting, after completing marches on foot. And Lieutenant Colonel V. Tugay's men took first place in recent district competitions for best battalion.

What does the example of such men as Major S. Krutko and Lieutenant Colonel V. Tugay teach us above all else? If every leader, every Communist, begins with himself, begins conscientiously, this approach to the matter becomes the norm for other members of the collective. Our party organization regards as its primary task that of developing precisely this vital stance in all the Communists. And what is very valuable is the fact that there is someone from whom to take an example, someone to try to emulate. Many of our officers--Majors V. Mareyev, S. Krutko, R. Goroshek and N. Plakhov, and Senior Lieutenants A. Akhinyan and Yu. Bobrov, for example--work in the spirit of the restructuring and acceleration, with initiative, with a sense of demandingness in evaluating first of all that which they themselves do.

Unfortunately, we also encounter cases in which people are in no hurry with respect to the restructuring and still think in the old ways. Senior Lieutenants S. Aristov and A. Zolotukhin were skeptical about using simulation equipment, for example. An experiment was conducted. For a month we recorded all the results from running through the same subjects in the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Uskov, who gives a great deal of attention to training the fightingmen with simulators, and in the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant Aristov. We then summed up the results. It turned out that Uskov's subordinates had gained more from the training. Furthermore, they had saved a considerable amount of materiel by using simulators. All of this was discussed in detail at a conference. We are planning a demonstration exercise, in which Senior Lieutenant Uskov will demonstrate methods of using simulators. Speaking of this, I want to stress the fact that the restructuring requirements and the new approaches must be incorporated in the plans and put into practice in the daily organizational work.

We servicemen of the Far East Military District feel a particular sense of pride in the fact that the principles describing the enormous scope and extent of the work ahead, which no Soviet individual can ignore, were voiced in our region. When one tries to grasp the meaning of articles on Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's trip to the Far East and his speeches on our land, one becomes convinced that the restructuring is an urgent matter, that it pertains to everyone and everything. The main thing right now is for everyone to work harder at his post. This will be our concrete contribution to the restructuring.

11499

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

RESTRUCTURING : ROLE OF MILITARY PARTY MEMBERS IN SUBUNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Aug 86 p 1

[Unsigned article: "Party Organization and Strengthening Discipline"]

[Text] Intensifying in every way the human factor in all matters, including work to consolidate military collectives and increase the organization, order, and efficiency of military work, is today one of the main trends in party work. Proceeding from the evaluation of matters in the directives of the 27th CPSU Congress, we must shift the tasks levied by the party to radically improve military discipline into the language of specific efforts by organizers and of indoctrinational and ideological measures to increase the personal responsibility of communists and all military personnel for the state of affairs in units and aboard ship.

In the solution of these problems shifts to the better can be clearly seen where the orientation is toward people and living conditions. These positive results have graphically shown up, for example, in several airborne assault units. In one of them where Guards Lt Col Yu. Kurchakov is a member of the party committee, they began restructuring the work of the regimental party organization to radically improve military discipline by developing the communists' aggressiveness, animation, vigor, and sense of principle. Everything was done so that every communist would work more intensely, and there was a sharp turn from mobilizing people toward strictly organizing the performance of tasks to strengthen order and discipline in all lines, and mainly on the personal level, and the campaign was intensified for an honest and clean aspect on the part of party members. In party influence on people preference was given to preventing violations and to individual work directly in the companies, batteries, and platoons, where military skills are forged. Also valuable for this was the experience of the party committee headed by Guards Capt S. Zholovan (Leningrad Military District), which was recently discussed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

However, not all army and navy party organizations are yet approaching their work of strengthening military discipline from present-day positions. In places an inclination continues toward customary methods -- directives and various commissions, there is no outspoken reaction to deficiencies, and personal accountability is weak. It is tolerated that some communists do not make high demands of themselves or of others, depart from regulations, and do

not serve as an example in military training and discipline.

The party committee of "N" Motorized Rifle Regiment (Northern Group of Forces) has not gotten rid of the habit of evaluating the state of affairs in the unit contrary to the actual situation and the measures indicated in plans. In meetings, conferences, and conversations Maj I. Aprisyan and several other party committee members have said much about the need for the unit to maintain strict regulatory order and to improve its organization. However, the actual organizational measures undertaken have clearly been inadequate, and attention is weak regarding ideological work to indoctrinate personnel with a spirit of conscientious military discipline. A principled party evaluation has not been given to instances of violation of daily routine or attempts by some communists to whitewash the actual state of affairs and conceal violations.

There can be no movement forward and no restructuring if party organizations do not maintain an atmosphere of intolerance toward deficiencies, toward stagnation of matters, and toward sham efficiency and idle talk. What is the important thing in party work to strengthen military discipline? First of all, to ensure the vanguard role of communists to maintain order and organization in units and aboard ships. It is expressed on the one hand by party members' personal example of behavior in service and in personal life, and on the other in their specific organizational efforts to strengthen discipline and increase everyone's personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the collective. Matters now stand as follows: a communist in the company party organization is responsible for everything that goes on in his subunit, and within his section and barracks he must ensure strict compliance with regulations, and the indoctrination of people with a sense of organization. It is important to increase attention to the quality of indoctrinational measures. Communists must continually develop political contacts with non-party personnel and with army youth. In this connection, the role of party committees and party bureaus has increased for instructing communists in specific organizational work. Party committees and party bureaus must devote their main time to the lively organization of affairs and to training lower party organizations and party activists in methods of party influence on strengthening discipline.

Responsibility for maintaining organization and order in units and aboard ships rests with the one-man commander. It is the most important task of his superiors, political agencies, and party organizations to help him to acquire a Leninist style of work, based on deep ideological conviction, purposefulness, a high sense of responsibility, and closeness to people. They must actively and reliably support commanders' requirements and do everything necessary to strengthen one-man command.

Officers have a decisive role in the indoctrination of personnel and strengthening discipline and order. Party organizations are called on to strengthen their prestige, to teach specific organizational work in subunits, and to reliably instill knowledge of how to properly deal with the power granted him by regulations.

Wherever a communist serves -- in a subunit or on a staff, in an institution

or an enterprise -- he has the obligation, as noted in the CPSU Statutes, to combat conceit, self-satisfaction, and sham. It is not enough for a party member to see deficiencies and mention them. He must do everything so that there are none, and so that the subunit and every serviceman lives strictly in conformity with the requirements of combined-arms regulations. To ensure this we must not overlook a single form of party work. The richer the party organization's arsenal of ways and means of understanding people and influencing their conscience and behavior, the closer will be the moral unity among military personnel and the stronger military discipline will be. A very important part is played here by propaganda on the advanced experience of the best army and navy instructors, and by ensuring the active participation of communist warrant officers, petty officers, sergeants, and first sergeants in upholding regulations in subunits.

An important factor in strengthening discipline is precise, rhythmical, and well organized combat training that takes in all personnel. Helping commanders to create combat stress in exercises that will ensure conditions that preclude any violation of military order is the order of the day that party organizations are called on to put into practice every day and without fail. Political and organizational work must be carried on constantly in subunits. No communist can stand aside from this work, and all are called on to instill a sense of respect for regulations and be models of discipline.

12697

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

PVT. SHISHKIN PHONE HOME: COMMISSARIATE LOSES DRAFTEE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Astafyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Ural Military District, under the rubric "In the Wake of a Letter": An Unforeseen Delay"]

[Text] Let me say first that the spring callup for military service is over. But the events encountered during it while investigating a letter from N. V. Shishkina deserve mention in the pages of our paper in order to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

I met Nina Vasilyevna Shishkina at the Sverdlovsk Oblast collection point for draftees.

"I have come 100 or more versts to find out why my son has not yet been sent to his unit," she told me with unconcealed alarm. "This is the fifteenth day he has been here. I keep thinking all kinds of thoughts..."

"Perhaps he has left?" interjected Lt Col Yu. Razumov, the chief of the collection point.

"No, they told me he is still here. It's just that they can't find him anywhere."

"Let's take a look now," said Yuriy Gennadyevich.

Within a few minutes the P.A. loudspeaker was announcing the name of draftee Shishkin, who was being summoned to headquarters. And we went on farther to learn something about the collection point.

"This is our museum of military glory," proudly stated the collection point's deputy chief for the political unit, Maj A. Ochkanov, indicating a new building. "Here we acquaint the draftees with the history of the oblast and the district. War veterans and the city's party and Komsomol workers address the young men."

But here the political worker's face clouded over.

"True, there are problems with the museum. It is not officially authorized, and we had to set it up on a voluntary basis..."

As we were approaching the barracks the loudspeaker again called for draftee Shishkin. We began to wonder, where could he have gotten to?

"Hard to say," said Maj Ochkanov, shrugging his shoulders. "He could be on housekeeping chores, or, more likely, he is sleeping in the woods..."

The barracks was not cozy, but gloomy. Here and there draftees were lying on their bunks.

"Company commander Sr Lt Sushilov," an officer approaching us introduced himself.

"How many draftees are in your company?" I asked him with interest.

"There are 300 left."

"But precisely how many? We are talking about people..."

"They can give you the exact figure in the staffing department. We only assign people to chores and policing up the area."

Shishkina's lips trembled. Noticing it, the collection point chief began to reassure her: "Don't you worry. At 2000 hours there will be a general formation, and your son will show up. He may be working somewhere in town."

Observing our puzzled looks, Lt Col Razumov hastened to explain: "By arrangement with the local authorities we sometimes send draftees to work at enterprises. I realize that that is not legal. But what can we do? They often help us as well. For example, we recently had need of a crane. And where else could we get one..?"

Finally, by our joint efforts we managed to understand why draftee Shishkin had been so long at the collection point. It turned out that he had been twice assigned to detachments being shipped out, but he took advantage of the lack of control and did not show up for the formation, assuming that he had been mistakenly put on the list of military construction workers, since he was supposed to serve in aviation, as he had been told at the rayon military commissariate.

"But for health reasons, Shishkin cannot serve in aviation," a staff officer of the collection point explained.

But Andrey Shishkin himself did not know anything about that. None of the collection point officers had discussed it with the young man or explained the situation to him. It turned out that Shishkin was not alone in that situation.

Naturally, a young man has no choice of place or arm of service. He is sent

where his capabilities, education, and health will do the Homeland the most good. But why have divergences cropped up between the decisions of the draft commissions and those of the collection point? What attitude will the young men have on reaching their units and what impression will they have of the work of the military commissariates?

You will agree that there is nothing hard about giving a person the proper explanations.

Let's go back to the question: why didn't anyone know where draftee Shishkin was? The answer is simple: the young men have been left with absolutely no control.

"We are not responsible for them," said Lt Col Razumov, raising his hands. "Our job is to turn the draftees over to the representatives of the troop units. They will take care of them. We don't have any such possibilities, we do not have enough people..."

There is no doubt that while the draftees are there the collection point personnel have a great deal to do. Nonetheless, the references to difficulties do not sound convincing enough. But collection point officers, if anyone, should be fully aware that according to the laws in force, the beginning of actual military service counts from the day a draftee appears at the military commissariate for shipment to a troop unit. A collection point is therefore an organization that has the responsibility to strictly observe all military procedures. Including the provision in the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces that obligates commanders to establish and maintain strict internal order, to strengthen conscientious discipline, to prevent infractions, and to always have precise and detailed information on their personnel.

And what was the actual situation at this collection point? Disorder, lack of control, and indifference to people. No wonder this was exploited by various entrepreneurs, who practically under the noses of responsible officers, freely sold alcohol right outside the collection point.

"But what can we do?" Lt Col Razumov said sadly. That's the way it has always been..."

Obviously, the question "Why so?" must also be put to Col M. Kibin, the oblast military commissar.

While in the courtyard of the collection point, the loudspeaker continued to call and summon Shishkin. And I recalled a recent conversation with Sr Lt Yu. Naumov, who had come back from Altay Kray, where he had gone for his young replacements.

"The premises of the kray collection point were all clean and orderly," said this officer. "The collection point personnel strictly saw to that. And there were no problems making up my detachment. The officers knew exactly where the draftees were, and promptly made up the detachments in strict

conformity with the instructions of the military commissariates. The draftees were sent to their units with a good understanding of the basics of order and discipline."

Things should be run so that a collection point is not just a place to assemble draftees but a school of organization and discipline. But this requires a high sense of responsibility from those to whom this important sector is entrusted.

The next morning Nina Vasilyevna telephoned my office.

"They found my son," she announced joyfully. "It turned out that he really was in the woods."

And soon Andrey Shishkin unexpectedly returned home. The collection point personnel could not ship him out for military service: all suitable detachments had been formed up and had gone on their assignments. And so there was an unforeseen delay.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: LIZICHEV BOOK ON 'HUMAN FACTOR'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Sep 86 p 3

[Review by Maj Gen Avn V. Khalipov, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, under the rubric "New Books," of "Kursom XXVII syezda KPSS. Zashchita Otechestva: chelovecheskiy faktor" [On Course of the 27th CPSU Congress (Protecting the Homeland: The Human Factor)] by A.D. Lizichev, Voenizdat, 1986, 112 pages]

[Text] The Most Important Factor in the Defense of Socialism

A book by Army General A.D. Lizichev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, has been published: "Zashchita Otechestva: chelovecheskiy faktor." It deals with basic questions concerning the vital functioning of the Soviet Armed Forces, the enhancement of their combat readiness, the strengthening of discipline and organization, and the place and role of political organs in the accomplishment of these tasks.

The book focuses attention on activation of the human factor in an extremely important area of our life: the defense of the socialist homeland in the contemporary situation and activation of the possibilities of this factor for accomplishing the important tasks involved in the combat and political training of the personnel.

The book's main merit lies in its coverage of these key questions of the theory and praxis of military organizational development from the broad, creative perspectives of Marxism-Leninism, in a spirit of the innovative ideas and aims coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress.

An important place in the book is given over to describing the main trends and conflicts in world development and the assessment of the militaristic, adventurist policy of reactionary imperialist circles in the USA and their accomplices. The book exposes the reckless course of "Star Wars" preparations, a course dangerous to the cause of peace and universal security, of taking the arms race into space and the buildup of nuclear weapons, which is creating an enormous threat to human civilization.

It is these circumstances, the book convincingly demonstrates, which are motivating the party, the people and the army to increase their revolutionary vigilance, to keep a close eye on the dangerous intrigues of the foes of peace and socialism, to work unceasingly to strengthen the reliable defense of the Soviet Nation and the entire socialist commonwealth.

The fact emerges throughout the book that the fulfillment of the long-range, creative plans and programs, which are of inestimable importance with respect to the nation's fate, requires a reliable defense for the foreseeable, historical future. In order for our society, oriented toward the future, to successfully reach the threshold of the Third Millennium and confidently enter the 21st Century, it is essential to activate and utilize the human factor in all spheres and areas, including, and perhaps to a particular degree, the defense of socialism.

The in-depth and thorough disclosure of this central idea can therefore be considered as an indisputable success for the author. The book clearly describes the essence of the human factor, its place and role, its specific features and possibilities in the matter of defending the homeland, and demonstrates the far from exhausted resources and reserves of that factor and ways to utilize and intensify them in the present situation. It is of fundamental importance that the discussion is linked very closely to the life and functioning of the Armed Forces, using specific facts and examples, and organically interlinked with the main components of their combat capability.

The reader sees in the book a clear and expressive social portrait of the Soviet fightingman, patriot and internationalist, and of the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole. The book convincingly demonstrates to the reader that our Armed Forces constitute a social organism with a powerful human factor.

Today, almost 80 percent of the first-term servicemen have a higher or secondary education, and the others have at least an 8th-grade education. This is a result of the move to compulsory, universal secondary education in the USSR. More than 84 percent of those drafted into the army and navy have various technical specialties, acquired in industry or agriculture or in DOSAAF organizations.

Membership of an absolute majority of Soviet fightingmen in the Communist Party or the Lenin Komsomol says a great deal. Suffice it to say that more than 90 percent of the army and navy officers are members of the CPSU or the Komsomol. Almost 80 percent of the companies and batteries in the Ground Forces have party organizations, for example. The vast majority of combat crews in the Strategic Rocket Forces consist entirely of Communists. Today, more than 80 percent of the pilots and navigators in the Air Forces, more than 90 percent of the officers on the Navy's missile submarines, and 95 percent of the tactical control officers for duty personnel in the Air Defense Forces are Communists.

These facts alone demonstrate fairly convincingly what the Soviet citizen-and-fightingman and our army and navy, which guard the Soviet people's peaceful labor and protect peace and security throughout the world, are like today.

The book is particularly instructive in its presentation of the urgent contemporary matters of restructuring the party and Komsomol work in the army and navy and raising it up to the level of the new demands. A great deal of attention is devoted to the political, psychological and organizational aspects and to demonstrating the urgency of the restructuring also in our military organism, the need to involve each and all in the restructuring and the special role which the cadres in charge have in it. The restructuring has to begin with oneself--this is the conclusion which will be drawn by everyone who reads the author's unforgettable reflections on the complex restructuring process.

The book raises the important problems of the fightingmen's spiritual life, the role of works of literature and art in the military man's destiny and their irrefutable emotional impact upon what is an essentially new generation of fightingmen who lack the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

The book defines and discusses in detail the indoctrinational tasks performed in the Armed Forces and problems having to do with creating and developing in the personnel a scientific world outlook, Communist conviction, courage and patriotism, socialist internationalism, unity of words and deeds, and finally, uncompromisingness with respect to bourgeois ideology. The book contains some interesting material which convincingly refutes the slanderous fabrications of our ideological foes with respect to the Soviet Armed Forces.

By turning precisely to all the key issues, to all aspects of the vital functioning of the forces, the author thus reveals thoroughly and profoundly, with theoretical and practical substance, the human factor's essence and its role in the area of national defense. In strict accordance with the demands of life itself, he draws the extremely important conclusion that the quality performance of the operational and combat training tasks and plans must be the concrete response of fightingmen of the army and navy to the historic decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress. The main stress must be on further enhancing the role of the human factor in the accomplishment of the missions involved in the field, air and naval training, and on making the training of the troops and naval forces conform as closely as possible to the conditions of combat reality.

This is the path to the accomplishment of the responsible tasks set forth for the Armed Forces at the 27th CPSU Congress.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

ARMY GEN GUSAKOVSKIY ON IMPORTANCE, REQUIREMENTS OF SURPRISE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Army Gen I. Gusakovskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union under the rubric "The School of Front Experience": "The Surprise Factor"]

[Text] Soon our tank battalion will be taking part in exercises that will be held in places where Soviet troops fought bravely during the last war, including the guards-tankers commanded by I. Gusakovskiy, who is now an army general and twice Hero of the Soviet Union. We have read with interest the views of this frontline fighter on the role of surprise in battle. (Guards Maj V. Sokol, Red Banner Belorussian Military District).

Surprise, as one of the basic principles of waging a combined-arms battle, is of permanent importance. A. V. Suvorov regarded bold maneuver and sudden strike at the enemy's weakest spot a highly important factor in victory. Just look at his "Science of Victory." This renowned commander wrote: "The enemy thinks that you are 100 or 200 versts away, but you, by making giant strides, swoop down on him unexpectedly. The enemy...expects you from the open field, but you, from the steep mountains and dense forests, fall on him like snow on his head..." Generalissimo Suvorov brilliantly put this into practice. For example, in the battle on the Rimnik in 1789, the troops under his command carried out a concealed maneuver and by a sudden attack utterly defeated an enemy who outnumbered them by a factor of four. The history of the Great Patriotic War yields many shining examples of bold use of the surprise factor. I will cite my own experience.

The massive-scale Vistula-Oder Campaign began on 12 January 1945. As the commander of the 44th Guards Tank Brigade I was given the mission to break through and strike the rear of the Hitlerites. Our brigade crossed the Vistula at night to a bridgehead near Warsaw, and when day came we began the breakthrough with infantry and artillery preparation. As the advanced detachment of the 11th Guards Tank Corps we dashed ahead and soon arrived at the Pilica River. It turned out that there were no bridges, and the situation was delicate.

What to do? Wait until the combat engineers arrived and laid a bridge? But that would mean to lose time and allow the enemy to dig in on a favorable

line. In other words, to lose the surprise factor. But we had taught our subordinates then that surprise and resoluteness were inseparable. But they, to put it graphically, has such tankists' weapons as gun, armor, and tracks.

The automatic riflemen commanded by Guards Capt V. Yudin crossed the river on the thin ice, drove in the enemy outposts with a headlong attack, and dug in on the west bank. Then, after blowing up the ice, the tank battalions forded the Pilica by assault and continued the headlong advance.

Ahead was Ravva-Mazovetska, a major enemy strong point. To engage it in battle would mean to lost time and forces. But if we bypassed it and advanced to the main highway, would the Hitlerites be able to cut off our way back? This maneuver was skillfully accomplished at night in a 123-km dash by the battalion commanded by Guards Maj A. Karabanov. The brigade advanced right behind them, followed at dawn by other units of the 11th Guards Tank Corps. They all dashed toward the Oder.

In their path was the enemy's Mezeritskiy strong point. "Dragons' teeth" they called the black antitank obstacles dug into the earth. There were a ferro-concrete ridge of works casemated with steel decking, tunnels, and underground stores -- all mined, and armored with steel and concrete.

Assaulting so powerful a strong point did not seem to be a realistic mission. All the same, we decided to attack it from the march with a pile driver assault. This was not impetuous bravery, or valor for valor's sake. If we had waited for the main body and decided to defer battle, then we would certainly have lost the fortunate opportunity that had opened up for us -- of suddenly attacking an enemy who so far suspected nothing.

And once again the battalion went forward under the command of Guards Maj Karabanov, that exceptionally brave, decisive, and innovative commander. Without stopping, his tankers forced their way across the bridge, before the Hitlerites had the time to blow it up. Then, turning 180 degrees, the battalion opened fire from the rear against the enemy pillboxes. The brigade's other subunits streamed through the gap opened by Karabanov's tanks. That is how we forced our way through -- by decisive and most importantly, by surprise blows against the enemy.

During the operation, operating right from the Vistula in the forward detachment in isolation from the corps' main body, our brigade fought for several days, covering 80-100 km per day. And it was always surprise that helped us to emerge victorious when engaging superior enemy forces.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War is evidence that surprise has a powerful psychological impact on the enemy and paralyzes his will.

The concept of surprise in battle essentially boils down to inflicting a blow where the enemy is least prepared to parry it. Under contemporary conditions its importance has grown immeasurably. Improvement in means of combat and increased troop mobility have brought about radical changes in the tactical operations of subunits and units. Victory in battle rests on him who is able

to impose his will on the enemy, act decisively, and inflict blows where they are least expected.

Of course, as you know, there are no battles that are exactly alike. Therefore the ways of achieving victory cannot be just the same. Much depends here on the commander's preparations, on his ability to creatively solve tactical problems and to direct his fire and subunits, and on his ability to evaluate when organizing a battle all the nuances of the situation, including the terrain, climatic and weather conditions... But there are still underlying principles. Surprise is achieved primarily by rapid and decisive actions, careful observation of camouflage measures, preventing the enemy from seizing favorable lines and positions, opening fire unexpectedly, and employing new ways of waging a battle.

It must not be forgotten that the enemy will not remain seated with his arms folded, but he will also be trying to operate with surprise. That means that combat must not be stereotyped, fire pockets and artificial obstacles must be set up in the depth of the defense, and ambushes must be arranged... Thus, it is not enough to provide everything possible for delivering a surprise blow, but it is also important to prevent surprise operations by the opposing side and to do the maximum to reduce their effectiveness.

Reconnaissance has a special role in achieving surprise. Continual knowledge of the enemy, his intentions, forces, and means, and discovering enemy measures directed at deceiving and confusing our troops, and combatting his reconnaissance are the tasks of all commanders.

Experience in war has taught that an important role in achieving surprise is played by concealed troop control, preparing troops for battle, strict observance of camouflage measures, and extensive use of feint and decoy measures.

I recall how in the Zhitomir-Berdichevsk operation our brigade completed a 150-km march in a snowstorm and made a concealed approach to a heavily fortified enemy strong point. It would have been difficult to take it from the march. After assessing the situation it was decided to attack the enemy from the front with one battalion to create the impression that the main body was attacking there. To achieve this, the attack was supported by heavy artillery fire. A battle was joined, during which the enemy was convinced that the main forces were operating against him in that sector, and he began draw subunits there from the flanks. Then the Hitlerites were struck by the battalions dispatched to envelop him. This was so much a surprise to the enemy that he became demoralized, could not put up serious resistance, and suffered a defeat.

Frontline experience has not lost its importance even in our time. Unfortunately, some commanders in tactical exercises rarely utilize the surprise factor, but resort to the tried and true methods of concealment employed by us in battles with the enemy, such as putting down smoke, setting up decoy positions with dummy equipment, and painting combat vehicles with terrain colors.

The most favorable opportunities for achieving surprise occur at night.

Darkness makes it possible to regroup forces onto new axes, and to move up to the initial area for an attack. Bold and brave night operations even by small subunits have achieved surprise and victory over superior enemy forces. It is no accident that frontline soldiers say that "Night is the ally of the brave and the bold."

Let me cite an example. During the East Pomeranian operation the brigade's advanced detachment, under the command of Guards Maj M. Pinskiy, reached the outer fortifications of the city of Kolberg at night. Taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the Hitlerites for defense, this officer decided on a surprise night attack to destroy the garrison. Tanks with their headlights on burst into the streets at high speed. Panic broke out among the Hitlerites. Without losing a single tank the advanced detachment took the city by morning.

It must be kept in mind, however, that surprise by itself cannot guarantee decisive victory in battle. It merely creates conditions that can be exploited to achieve the enemy's total defeat. It is important not to allow the opposing side to pull itself together, to restore its temporarily lost combat capability, or to regain the initiative.

There are many methods of achieving surprise: employing new tactical methods, unexpectedly opening fire, and active night operations. The greatest effect comes from the integrated use of these methods and approaches. One thing surprise is not allowed is repetition. To employ one and the same methods of combat or to maneuver in a stereotyped way without considering the specific situation dooms you to failure.

The surprise factor... We must constantly study how to use it skillfully. And the most reliable method here is to improve field training and the quality and effectiveness of every exercise. I think that fellow servicemen of Guards Maj V. Sokol will have plenty of opportunity during training to choose the most deliberate and original methods of achieving surprise.

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WARSAW PACT

ORDER TO GERMAN DEPUTY MINISTER

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Sep 86 p 3

[Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Awarding the Order of the Red Star to Comrade Fritz Streletz, Deputy Minister of National Defense and Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the GDR]

[Text] Colonel General Fritz Streletz, Deputy Minister of National Defense and Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, is awarded the Order of the Red Star for his services in strengthening combat cooperation between the Armed Forces of the USSR and the National People's Army of the GDR.

A. Gromyko, Chairman of the USSR Supreme
Presidium

T. Menteshashvili, Secretary of the USSR
Supreme Soviet Presidium

Moscow, the Kremlin
26 September 1986

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ARMED FORCES

MAJ GEN MIKHAYLOV ON TREATMENT, TRAINING OF JUNIOR OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Mikhaylov, under the rubric: "Work with Cadres: Trust and High Expectations": "A Lieutenant's First Year"]

[Text] As far as I can remember of my command posts, I have not altered the habit of making a mandatory analysis of how the recent graduates of military schools have done in their first year as lieutenants.

This August was no exception. Getting ready to meet last year's graduates on the eve of the arrival of fresh forces of officers, I tried to sum up: How are they shaping up? What have they given to the division, and what have we, their senior comrades, given to them?

Lt S. Omelchenko... Only yesterday I spoke with the regimental and battalion commanders about him. The opinion was unanimous -- he is ready to command a company: he is serious, vigorous, and intelligent. And what is especially important -- he has good instincts as an organizer and teacher, and demands much of himself and his subordinates. I turn over the pages of my notebook -- didn't he distinguish himself at the regimental tactical exercises?

True enough. They put him in a difficult situation. And he acquitted himself well. By himself and without prompting. We will promote him as an officer. This is how he will develop.

Lt Runtsevich... Barely coped with his platoon. Does not seek contact with his subordinates and displays elements of haughtiness and rudeness...

A year ago at our first meeting these two officers both struck me with their eagerness to get on with the job as soon as possible and with their good theoretical grounding. It even seemed to me then that Runtsevich appeared to be more well read and erudite.

But who would have thought things would not turn out as desired with this officer? And why? Lt. Runtsevich fell behind his fellow officer mainly in his attitude toward his work. It has long been a well known truth that if a man tries and shows initiative, he will get ahead. But if he is in the mood for work only when prompted, he will stay in one place. And if he doesn't

know how to rally the collective and get close to his subordinates, and if he displays lack of interest and rudeness, then he is on the downward path.

Something like that happened here. From the very beginning Omelchenko set about studying the new equipment and weapons, and set himself the task of becoming familiar within six months with all the specialities in his company... He was not shy about working for an hour or two on a simulator with his best gun layer or driver-mechanic, or of going for instruction to an experienced platoon commander to pick up his methods. He treated his subordinates without pretension but strictly.

Runtsevich did not know how to do this. He felt that he had quite enough knowledge, he considered it demeaning to learn from his subordinates or other officers, and he had no wish to overcome his egotism. And when he was given advice, suggestions, and hints, he took the stance that he was fully aware and knew what to do. But he did little.

A young officer's attitude toward the service and his way of life do mean a lot. Both his superiors and his subordinates notice it. They develop their opinion of the man.

And every single time you come up against a case where a young officer turns out unsuccessfully, you have to ask the question: is he the only one to blame? And this is natural, since the untrodden path of development does not go through a desert or a vacuum, nor does the young lieutenant travel it by himself. Getting through it successfully also calls for much effort on the part of his immediate superiors. Some of them, however, often look on a lieutenant who just graduated from school as a fully developed officer who is ready to perform his functional obligations impeccably and precisely. Thus, they only issue orders and criticize mistakes, but do not help or teach. The lieutenant then starts to act more inhibitedly and loses heart.

Something of the sort happened to Lt T. Khusnulin. He is a man of strong will. People like that require a special approach. But the company commander Capt S. could not take the trouble to find the approach. From the very start his actions were linear, and one might say primitive and not thought out. If Khusnulin was poorly prepared for training, the company commander reprimanded him. If shortcomings were noted during independent study, there was another penalty. And so it went...

But there were really no grounds for punishing the young officer. He could not prepare himself for training as he should have, since he was carrying out the orders of the company commander, and did not have time. He was unable to organize self-study, because he did not have enough experience, and needed to acquire some.

In a word, the company commander was lacking in support, tact, a sense of proportion, and respect for the platoon commander. His injustice and rudeness very soon alienated his subordinate. Someone had to intervene to correct this style of work and rescind certain erroneous decisions. But the company commander took the stance: "Transfer him to duty not involving personal

contacts..."

What can we say of this? I believe that we would agree with that request. It would be better for the service. If a man does not understand or wish to understand that he must definitely give up old and outmoded methods of leadership and working with personnel, and if he is not capable of doing so, then he cannot be trusted with important and responsible work.

I say this because in many years of service I have met up with a good number of sorry commanders who have ruined the career of more than one lieutenant.

It often happens that it is just such obstinate and strong-willed lieutenants who grow in time into sensible, exacting, and reliable commanders of battalions, regiments and divisions...

When I was still a regimental commander we had a unit with a Lt V. Stekolnikov. Not six months from the time he arrived at the unit it was reported that this officer would have to be brought before the court of honor and dismissed from the Komsomol. It was said that he was insolent to the company commander and did not carry out his orders. I decided to personally find out what was going on. It turned out that when the company commander sent the platoon out for training, he left almost half the men to perform housekeeping chores, and the platoon commander protested that it shouldn't be that way, that everybody should go for training. Stekolnikov introduced new methods for training specialists, but the company commander said: "Don't complicate things. Do it the way everyone else does." That is, follow the book and the old ways.

Soon regimental exercises began. I decided to take a close look at the lieutenant to see what he was worth. I gave him a difficult assignment requiring independence.

What happened? Stekolnikov showed his best side. He performed with initiative, vigor, and decisiveness.

After that I had a serious talk with the company commander. It was not hard to realize that the heart and core of his relations with his subordinate was predicated on the wish to prevent Stekolnikov from looking better than himself.

We transferred the lieutenant to another unit, and assigned him the poorest platoon. Within six months it was the outstanding platoon. A year later it was still the outstanding platoon.

A few years later by fate I again encountered Maj Stekolnikov. I found out that he had never again received a single reprimand, but had earned many commendations. He has an important job.

I recalled this not long ago when one of my regimental commanders reported that he had in mind some strict punishment for Lt A. Sokolov. "For what?" I asked. "He is poorly prepared for training -- that's it." But why. What is

the cause? The answer was silence. The regimental commander did not know. I advised him not to be in a hurry, not to mince matters, and to get to the heart of the matter. A week later he reported that the lieutenant's heart was not in the service. All his life he had dreamed of being in reconnaissance, he had trained for that speciality, and they had put him in something different...

He was assigned as commander of the reconnaissance platoon. The lieutenant immediately came to life, meaning that he became enthusiastic about the service. The reconnaissance platoon commander is much admired.

What does this mean? That when working with people who annoy us, we have a slight tendency to treat them with indifference, passivity, and formalism. But passivity and formalism have a negative impact on discovering lieutenants' potentialities and capabilities, and on success in the common cause. And what is particularly dangerous, they clip the wings of the young, generate in them feelings of apathy and indifference toward the service, and undermine confidence in their own powers and growth potential.

We, their senior comrades, must not forget what the lieutenants' first year is -- a year of great difficulty for the officers, not only in their development as commanders, but also from the everyday standpoint. This is the time the young lieutenants are establishing their families and starting an independent life. But we sometimes forget this, and believe that a lieutenant has nothing to think about but the service. And when a former bachelor returns from leave with a young wife, we grumble in annoyance. Annoyed that we have to think and take the trouble to get quarters for the young people.

For the past year we have had the addition of several young families. Some have been able to go home on leave. They live quite well. In our years as lieutenants we could not have dreamed of such conditions. But why make comparisons? Times have changed.

But living problems still exist. We try to solve them. This is a very important matter, and success in combat training, in service, and in discipline depend on it. Everything does.

But how do we help the lieutenant to take a rest, and relax in his free time? What is showing on the stage at the officers' club? We often undertake boring and routine steps that do something for the mind and heart.

We have been thinking about this. A good rest also acts to improve combat readiness. It is particularly important to recall this under conditions of troop formations where officers' clubs and officers's houses are the main cultural centers.

It is very important that the lieutenants' year is a successful one in the biographies of the young officers, and that they establish a firm foundation from which they can confidently move ahead toward their future as commanders.

12697

CSO: 1801/3

ARMED FORCES

LT GEN SADOVNIKOV NOTES GROWING ROLE OF HELICOPTER IN COMBAT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Panyukov, correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under the rubric "Combat Training: Quality and Effectiveness": "Initiative by Helicopter Personnel"; passages in all caps printed in bold face]

[Text] The appearance of the "enemy's" tank reserve was a complete surprise for the motorized rifle and tank subunits [podrazdeleniya]. Neither the overall tactical situation nor reconnaissance data had given a hint of any such possibility. Obviously, the senior commander had been keeping this interpolation in reserve, so to speak: as a serious test of the combined-arms commander, who now, while in mid-course, had to make adjustments in his decision or find additional possibilities to destroy the "enemy" tanks by fire.

Maj I. Sokolov, the chief of air, fire, and tactical training fully understood what a delicate position the combined-arms commander was in. And he very much wanted to help the advancing troops. But how? The helicopter crews had already performed their mission during the fire preparation for the attack.

"But what if the attackers were now supported by fire from helicopters?" mused Sokolov.

Of course, to do that they would have to operate at maximum low altitudes, lower than the trajectories of the shells of the supporting artillery. But surely the performance of such a mission was not beyond such first-class military fliers as Maj V. Ivanov, and Capts V. Boldyrev and A. Abulkhanov, who had recently served in Afghanistan, or of their subordinates, who had constantly trained in operations as close as possible to combat conditions. Each of them had more than once engaged in single combat with functioning means of fire and emerged victorious. They were aided by their fine-tuned skill as pilots and ability to rapidly spot targets on the battlefield and accurately hitfile with rockets.

Sokolov presented these arguments to the senior commander. He supported the initiative of the helicopter personnel.

...And so, from behind the edge of the woods appeared the helicopters. They had been hidden by the slopes of a large ravine, through which the subunits

were advancing. A moment later the whirlybirds were over the rapidly advancing tanks. To the roar of artillery and tank weapons was added the whistling sound of rockets launched from the helicopters. After dealing with the targets these helicopters went off to reload, and their place was taken by others.

From my mobile command post I could clearly see how the missiles peppered the targets designating the "enemy" antitank reserve. Now nothing could stop the advancing subunits or hinder their high rate of attack.

THIS TACTICAL TRAINING EPISODE HAS BEEN COMMENTED ON BY THE DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR COMBAT TRAINING OF THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY, CHIEF OF THE COMBAT TRAINING DIRECTORATE LT GEN V. SADOVNIKOV:

"It is currently impossible to imagine a contemporary combined-arms battle without the use of combat helicopters. They are indispensable for performing reconnaissance and final reconnaissance, for landing tactical airborne assault forces, solving various tasks to provide engineer support, and naturally, to provide fire support. To successfully accomplish all these tasks the personnel of all subunits must be highly proficient and must cooperate precisely and steadily, as was done in this tactical training episode. The combined-arms subunits and the combat helicopter subunits functioned as a single well-adjusted mechanism.

As a result of this innovative solution to a difficult interpolation, not only was the suddenly appearing "enemy" tank reserve reliably suppressed, but the fire power of the attacking subunits was considerably increased in the entire depth of the mission being carried out, and capabilities were increased for maneuvering by fire and stepping up the rate of advance.

The complexity of the tasks of a contemporary combined-arms battle calls for still greater integration and coordination in the operations of the units and subunits of the various arms and services. And this is not possible without further improvement in the skills of officers and staffs. It is essential for combined-arms commanders to study in greater depth the bases, methods, and conditions for employing combat helicopters. And the commanders of combat helicopter subunits must learn in greater detail the fine points of all types of a combined-arms battle."

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ARMED FORCES

TWO COMMENTARIES ON ALL-ARMY SOCIAL SCIENCES CONFERENCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 86 p 2

[Commentaries by Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Serebryannikov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor and Deputy Chief for Academic and Scientific Work at the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin and Rear Admiral V. Gulin, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor and Chairman of the Faculty of Marxism-Leninism at the Naval Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko: "Be More In Tune With Life"]

[Text] The All-Army Conference for heads of departments of social science and series of social-economic disciplines in the USSR Ministry of Defense's military educational institutions stressed that the realization of the provisions and conclusions contained in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev's program speech at the All-Army Conference for the Heads of Social Science Faculties must become the most important tasks in the activities of VUZ [institutions of higher education] and of social scientists. In moving from this party requirement, they must concentrate their primary attention on developing a scientific outlook and an active position in life for students and cadets and on arming them with the knowledge and skills necessary for productive work in the military.

Commentary by Lieutenant General Serebryannikov:

The conference showed the need for serious improvement in scientific-research work that is being done by social scientists. And this is natural. Scientific work for a teacher is an indicator of his professional skill and is a condition of high quality in his pedagogical activities. However, the situation today is such that returns from current scientific research still does not meet the needs of the time.

What upsets those of us in academia the most is the "stagnation" in the quality of scientific works and the lack of substantial advances in increasing

their theoretical and practical significance. Here is an example. There have been many dissertations completed in recent years and approximately one thousand major works have been published on the problems of strengthening military discipline, improving socialist competition and other urgent themes. But there has not always been a qualitative side, i.e. practical return, to match this quantitative output. There are times when the points of value that are contained in some works are hidden by the generally known theses and unimportant recommendations.

This leads one to the following conclusion. We are still lacking a spirit of healthy scientific criticism, fruitful discussion, high principles and responsibility for the business at hand. Many of us are still ruled by old concepts, criteria and approaches. We must decisively restructure our minds. And each one must begin with himself and his attitude toward work and must turn to quality and results.

At the same time we must also still be concerned about developing the optimum conditions for creative work by academicians. And this means that we must look into instructor loads and free them from as many secondary matters as possible and from being bothered by minor things.

It also appears that the efforts of social scientists must be more clearly coordinated, especially when they are working with major, urgent problems and introducing valuable scientific developments. And this will not happen without the creation of a single bank of military and political information which could hold all the necessary information on the scientific works by social scientists that have been completed and printed in VUZ's.

It would seem to me that scientific and research works must be managed by a single scientific council which would develop orders on the most urgent problems, regularly review work results and facilitate the businesslike introduction of their results into the policies of the forces and navies. This council could also take on the problem of maintaining very close relations between VUZ academicians and the outside world. Unfortunately there are many leaders in the military who are not interested in the results of research by social scientists and who also underestimate the science itself. Even bold, perspective research and recommendations are not supported at times. And today it is impossible to successfully resolve the difficult problems that the troops and naval forces have without relying on science.

Commentary by Rear Admiral V. Gulin:

The primary task before VUZ social scientist today is to drastically improve the quality of Marxist-Leninist scientific instruction. And one of the main routes to resolving this problem is bringing pedagogues closer to the real world and teaching theoretical questions in close association with real life. I cannot say that this is a new problem and that we military pedagogues have not and are not putting a lot of attention on it. We have done and are doing a lot. However, the reality is that we must openly admit that many of our

graduates have a superficial knowledge of social sciences and they are not able to make skillful use of social sciences in their practical activities. This leads to omissions in educating and training subordinates and in strengthening discipline and the unity of military collectives.

The conference thoroughly discussed specific ways for bringing instructions closer to reality. These included increasing instructor qualifications, reinforcing the individual approach in working with students and cadets and using active forms and methods of training. But all of these good thoughts and ideas will be for naught if we do not increase our demands on ourselves and if we do not work creatively and innovatively. If we do not make a decisive break with all those things that are bothering and slowing the restructuring of teaching. And if we do not resolutely put into practice those things that are most needed today.

For example, it is very obvious to me that we must introduce into academia a course on military pedagogy and psychology. We can hardly justify the fact that we train instructors for major military and naval collectives, specialists with higher military educations, but we do not give them a thorough knowledge to allow them to carry out practical work in the area of pedagogy and psychology.

The practical trend in teaching social sciences depends to a large degree on the scientific and methodological potential of faculties. It will obviously be more effective to have instructions conducted by one large, strong faculty with associated series in the individual disciplines and not have it the way we do today, with several faculties doing the instruction. It would seem that this would be more advisable today because graduates now will be given a comprehensive state examination in real problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, history and CPSU policies. By the way, this examination comes highly recommended, but is still not without problems. Disciplines are taught by subjects and the examination is comprehensive.

And there are many other problems that must be resolved.

12511

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ARMED FORCES

DISCUSSION OF BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES OF SERVICEMEN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by R. Saleyev, legal consultant, in the "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Inquiry Service" section: "Benefits for the Families of Servicemen"]

[Text] A. Smirtynyuk, S. Gybanova, M. Abduraimova and many others who read the newspaper have asked us to provide information about benefits that are provided to family members of servicemen who are called up for first-term active duty in the USSR Armed Forces.

In accordance with the regulations that are in effect, the wives of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and military construction workers from military construction detachments who are on active duty are exempt from taxes on bachelors and single-child and small families. First-term servicemen and their wives retain this tax benefit on bachelors and single-child and small families for the entire time that the serviceman is in medical facilities and on medical leave. In the event he is dismissed from active military service because of an illness, this benefit is retained for no more than one year from the date of discharge. The farms of kolkhoz workers and those of personnel who are not members of a kolkhoz, but whose family members are part of a kolkhoz, and who are on active military duty are exempt from paying the agricultural tax if the family has no other person, with the exception of the serviceman's wife or mother with children up to eight years of age, able to work. Family members of soldiers, sailors and sergeants who are on active military duty are not subject to land taxes and the tax on structures.

The living quarters that first-term servicemen occupied before being called up are retained for them and they will not be removed from waiting lists to obtain living quarters. If families of servicemen on first-term active duty have no other individual in the family who is drawing a salary, the families will pay for the living areas that they occupy at the appropriate minimum rate for quarters as established by law.

Families of servicemen in active military service and families of servicemen who have died or who are missing in action in defense of the USSR or in carrying out other duties of their military service may not be evicted by

court action from the living area that they occupy without being allotted living space.

Executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies have no more than one month from time of application by a wife whose husband has been called up for first-term active military service to place her children into available day nurseries, kindergardens or day nursery-kindergardens regardless of the departmental affiliation of these pre-school institutions. Children of servicemen on active duty and also their minor brothers and sisters who have been deprived of parental care will in all cases have priority placement in nurseries, children's homes, boarding schools and other institutions appropriate for them.

Families of servicemen in first-term service have postal privileges. In particular, they may send letters to soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sergeants major at their post of duty without paying postage. There will be no payment levied for forwarding and returning postal parcels addressed to first-term soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sergeants major.

Executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies have no more than one month from time of application by a wife whose husband has been called up for first-term active duty to find work for her.

Effective 1 January 1986, a USSR Council of Minister's Resolution has increased the size of the allowance on children of first-term soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sergeants major to 35 rubles per month.

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BENEFITS FOR SERVICEMEN RETIRING TO RESERVE STATUS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 86 p 4

[Reply to readers under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Information Service": "Benefits for Servicemen Released Into the Reserve"]

[Text] Readers N. Petrov, S. Khrustalev, A. Senin and others want to know about the benefits available to first-term servicemen after their release from the Soviet Army or Navy into the reserve.

Soldiers, seamen, sergeants and petty officers released into the reserve are ordinarily sent to the military commissariat at their place of residence prior to being drafted into the military. It is permitted to send those being released into the reserve to locations other than where they resided prior to being drafted only if their families have moved--and this must be documented--or when they leave as part of an organized recruitment to work in the national economy.

The executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies and the managers of enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes are required to provide those released into the reserve with work consistent with their specialty no later than 1 month from the day they apply. Those who worked prior to being drafted retain the right to a job at the same enterprise, organization or establishment.

Service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is included in total length of [civilian] service if no more than 3 months have gone by between the date of discharge from the service and the date the job is started. Service in the army is also included in the total length of service for those who did not work for hire prior to being drafted. In addition, time spent in the military service also counts toward the mandatory period of work following graduation from an educational institution for young specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education. First-term service in regions of the Far North and equivalent areas is included in length of service with the benefits provided workers in those areas if the serviceman begins working in regions of the Far North or equivalent areas, under contract, no later than 3 months following his release into the reserve.

Those drafted for active military duty while enrolled at an educational institution retain the right after being released into the reserve to reregister to

continue their education at the same educational institution and in the same course of study in which they were studying prior to being drafted. Furthermore, servicemen released from active military duty have priority for entering higher educational institutions, vocational and technical schools or courses of study in corresponding fields.

Regular leave may be granted to servicemen released into the reserve and sent to work as part of an organized recruitment, after they have worked 3 months. First-term servicemen on active military duty retain the housing area which they occupied prior to being drafted, and they may not be taken off the waiting list for housing. After the first 3 months of service have elapsed until they return from the service, the housing may be utilized in the manner established by Union republic law.

Upon their return from the service, these servicemen have the right to occupy the housing which they occupied prior to being drafted into the service. Individuals occupying the given housing are required to vacate it within a 2-week period.

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ARMED FORCES

AWARDS FOR PILOTS, NAVIGATORS

Moscow VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH
RESPUBLIK in Russian 20 Aug 86 p 629

[Ukase No 34 (2368) of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Awarding the
Honored Ranks of "Honored Military Pilot of the USSR" and "Honored Military
Navigator of the USSR" to Pilots and Navigators of Aviation in the Armed
Forces of the USSR]

[Text] The following honored ranks are awarded for exceptional services in
mastering aviation technology, for excellent indicators in educating and
training flight cadres and for many years of accident-free work in the
Aviation of the USSR Armed Forces:

"Honored Military Pilot of the USSR"

ABATIN Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich -- Colonel
AKCHURIN Farid Izmaylovich -- Colonel
ANANIN Boris Mikhaylovich -- Colonel
ARKHAROV Boris Konstantinovich -- Colonel
BOKOV Leonid Fedorovich -- Colonel
VASILYEV Gennadiy Borisovich -- Colonel
GORDEYEV Yuriy Semenovich -- Colonel
YEVDOKIMOV Aleksandr Nikolayevich -- Colonel
KISELEV Aleksandr Dmitriyevich -- Colonel
KOLESNIKOV Vladimir Ivanovich -- Colonel
LEONTYEV Aleksandr Ivanovich -- Colonel
LONGINENKO Vyacheslav Vikentyevich -- Colonel
NASTENKO Yuriy Vasilyevich -- Lieutenant General of Aviation
PAVLYUCHENKO Iosif Kazimirovich -- Colonel
PANIKAROV Yuriy Grigoryevich -- Colonel
PONOMAREV Vladimir Mikhaylovich -- Colonel
SVIRIDOV Yevgeniy Pavlovich -- Colonel
SKUGAREV Oleg Arsenyevich -- Colonel
SOKOL Vladimir Viktorovich -- Colonel
TELNOM Anatoliy Petrovich -- Colonel
TRAPEZNIKOV Viktor Konstantinovich -- Major General of Aviation
TROFIMOV Nikolay Petrovich -- Colonel
KHRAPONOV Ilye Vasilyevich -- Colonel

SHESHENA Timofey Semenovich -- Colonel
SHPAK Viktor Petrovich -- Major General of Aviation

"Honored Military Navigator of the USSR"

SEMYSHKIN Viktor Andreyevich -- Colonel
TARELKIN Vladimir Georgiyevich -- Colonel
TOPCHIIY Aleksandr Aleksandrovich -- Colonel

Writer for the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium -- A. Gromyko
Secretary for the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium -- T. Menteshashvili

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CSO: 1801/25

ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA NOTES EDITORIAL PLANS FOR UPCOMING YEAR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 86 p 4

[Text] To the Readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

The editorial office is currently receiving many letters in which the readers tell about how the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are implementing decisions coming out of the 27th party congress and effecting the restructuring in all areas of their work, contemplate what they would like KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to be like in 1987, and make interesting suggestions. The editorial office is grateful for them and will certainly take them into account in its operating plans.

It was letters from Colonel A. Savateyev, Major P. Kovalchuk, Sr WO M. Romanov and many other officers which suggested to the newspaper editors the subjects for the special-problem articles published under the rubrics "Military Discipline: Sites of Progressive Experience," "The Restructuring: The Communist's Position," "The Combat Training: Reserves for Acceleration," "Closeness with the People--a Feature of the Commander" and "For Conservation and Thrift." The newspaper is taking a closer look at life with the readers' help. Your letters help us to reflect more clearly and validly the problems brought forth by the times.

The newspaper will devote particular attention to the acceleration of the nation's social and economic development and the improvement of our Armed Forces at the contemporary stage, tell about those who have begun the restructuring with themselves by defining their civic position, by stepping up their political activity and their work, and by increasing their responsibility for the assigned job and the end results. At the same time, we shall continue to wage a determined campaign against those who continue to live in the old way, remaining on the sideline in the acceleration process, and are not altering their work style.

While publicizing the new and progressive in the life of the military collectives, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will at the same time vigorously fight to strengthen discipline and regulation order, and against mismanagement, laxity, dependency, bureaucracy and other negative things. In this area also the newspaper is counting on the help and cooperation of its subscribers and readers.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will continue to devote a great deal of attention to international subjects. The newspaper will continue to actively help to expose imperialism's aggressive policy, primarily that of the USA, and its acts of ideological diversion against the USSR and other socialist commonwealth nations.

The great feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the last war will continue to be one of the central subjects in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The newspaper will continue to publish articles on the military-patriotic indoctrination of the upcoming generation and on the work of military commissars and military instructors at schools and vocational and technical schools.

The editorial office strives persistently to see that the articles have an effect. Almost every issue reports on steps taken in response to critical articles and reports from readers. We shall continue to strive to see that every word hits the nail on the head and produces the needed result, and that those who like to remain silent or get off with formal replies to stinging newspaper articles change their attitude toward criticism.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has a large team of writers. The editorial office is interested in enlarging the newspaper's circle of friends, however, in taking their interests and requests into fuller account. For this purpose, we shall publish more letters and hold more conferences and meetings with readers. Their good advice and wishes will make it possible to make every article more specific and topical.

We await your letters, dear readers.

We would remind you, however, that subscriptions to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 1987 were available as of 1 August. They are accepted without restrictions by all communications departments, Soyuzpechat receiving points, public distributors at enterprises, in organizations, on kolkhozes and sovkhoses, subscription organizers in the military units, on the ships and at military establishments and educational institutions.

In order to receive KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by mail beginning on 1 January 1987, you need to fill out your subscription in good time, by 1 November of this year. Beginning on 1 November, subscriptions will be accepted for February and subsequent months of 1987.

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READERS' COMMENTS ON PREPARATION FOR WINTER DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 86 p 3

[Report by Maj A. Bugay, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA nonstaff correspondent, under the rubric "Winter Will Hold Us Strictly Accountable": "Every Hour is Precious"]

[Text] When the residents of Building No. 3 on Belanov Lane in Kaliningrad read in the newspapers that gymnasiums, children's playrooms and workshops were being set up at the initiative of the youth in the basements of a housing complex under construction in Severodvinsk, this urban development news did not amaze them with its boldness of concept. They have written sarcastically about this to the editor. They report that a real "bathhouse" with steam and a pool was built in the basement of their building. Unlike Severodvinsk, however, no initiative was needed to get it built. More the opposite: its absence on the part of housing directorate workers resulted in a situation in which the basement of the apartment has been regularly heated with hot water over a period of one and a half years, while the apartments lack hot water. This is destroying the foundation and making the walls damp.

"Winter preparation of the housing is now underway, but inefficiency on the part of the garrison management and the housing directorate means that we are going to have to spend the winter in the same conditions again," is what Comrade A. Ivanov and his neighbors foresee. They have already turned for assistance to the department of the Baltic Fleet's Naval Engineering Service and to the editor of the fleet newspaper.... The matter has still not been settled, however....

The editor's mailbag has recently contained many examples of careful preparations for winter. Many garrisons, military posts, units and installations are essentially already prepared for winter. There are also letters, many of them, in which people express concern, however.

This is what serviceman N. Dryuk (unfortunate rank), currently on a long temporary flight, which frequently takes him away from home, writes. Letters from the family always make us happy.

He writes that winter preparations are not being made in time. This could not fail to be a mistake.



heating system last year, the temperature did not rise above 10 degrees. Nor did electric heaters save the situation: the buildings frequently had no electricity for three or four days at a time. N. Dryuk certainly does not want a repeat of this. All the more since an addition to the family is expected.

This alarm is understandable in human terms. The general duties of servicemen as defined in the regulations include the following: "...steadfastly bear all of the hardships and deprivations of the military service...." The wives of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers bear these along with their husbands, without complaint. This is their duty. They chose it themselves. It is one thing when these hardships are a result of objective factors, however, and quite another when they result from someone's inefficiency, sluggishness, inattention or disinclination. There is no justification for these.

The residents of one of the Transbaykal garrisons also had a hard time last winter. The cold is severe there, and it does not excuse negligence with respect to preparations for winter. One day, the temperature in the apartments fell to zero. The command element had to halt the flights. Everything was thrown into rectifying the unexpected problems. To prevent this from happening again, a special repair brigade was set up this year to prepare the housing area for winter. It is commanded by Major N. Stepanov. His men set about their work with enthusiasm. But the scheduled performance of the work was hampered by a lack of coordination of the brigade's efforts with the organization which should have been most concerned about preparing the housing well for the winter, the rayon KECh [billeting unit]. "I have decided to appeal to the editorial office," Major N. Stepanov wrote. "Perhaps it can apply pressure to Major A. Golovko, chief of the KECh and force him to provide us with everything we need to prepare the post for winter." The author of the letter states that he has already made this request to the garrison chief and that the latter allegedly talked with Major A. Golovko. The talks did not get things moving, however. Apparently, not everywhere have the people learned how to turn their words effectively and efficiently into concrete results.

"Please help us get the repair of the heatline completed," is how many letters to the editor end. This includes a letter from the residents of Building No. 26 on Bibliotechnaya Street in Khimki. It might appear that the established technology is to dig up the heatline, replace part of the pipe and halt the repair work at that point until better times. The author of this article himself is well acquainted with this "technology." Every morning, he has to go around dozens of yards to reach the bus stop, and to wade home after a rain. The specialists have clarified the mechanism. The main cause is the absence of precise planning and provision of the projects with the necessary personnel and means. In other words, inability to direct things. The cold will not take people by surprise where the heatline repairs were thought out by days back in the spring, where the quantity of materials necessary for performing them was calculated, where the people to perform the work were specifically named.

The military posts have become more attractive and fresh-looking as a result of preparations for winter. A pleasure to look at! Not everywhere, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) I. Shutemov reports: "Our officers' club is dilapidated. Drain-pipes are broken. Last winter it lay in snowdrifts which reached to the windows." And this was not just because there is a lot of snow in Perm in the

winter. Apparently, those responsible for resolving this problem cannot understand the simple fact that the mood in which an individual leaves the officers' club will set the tone for his work pace for a long time.

It is not just the housing which must be prepared for winter, but also the classrooms, the combat vehicle pools, storage facilities and much, much more.

The letters from the readers rightly stress the fact that the winter will hold us strictly accountable. They also rightly state that all necessary steps need to be taken before it is too late. There is still time. Right now, every hour is precious.

11499

CSO: 1801/21

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

WAR, LABOR VETERANS ORGANIZATION CREATED--At the initiative of the Soviet public and in accordance with suggestions approved at the 27th CPSU Congress, the decision has been made to establish the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans. An organizing committee has been formed. G.P. Razumovskiy, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has been approved as chairman of the organizing committee. The organizing committee is located in Moscow (Gogolevskiy Boulevard, Building 4). [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 86 p 1] 11499

OBITUARY: COL A.S. BEREZOVSKIY--Command and the party committee of the Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate announce with deep regret the death of Col Anatoliy Semenovich Berezovskiy, section chief, CPSU member since 1967, and express their sympathy to the family and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 86 p 4] 11499

OBITUARY: COL V.A. BARMIN--Command and the party committee of the directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the USSR, friends and comrades announce with deep regret the death of Col Vitaliy Anatolyevich Barmin, section chief, CPSU member since 1963, and express their sympathy to the family and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Aug 86 p 4] 11499

CSO: 1801/254

GROUND FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF SMALL UNIT RECONNAISSANCE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Vysotskiy, staff officer from a major unit in the Far East Military District: "It Starts With Reconnaissance"]

[Text] The situation in the training area for subunits from one of the motor rifle regiments was developing in a dynamic fashion and was becoming more and more intense with every passing minute. The "enemy" was actively maneuvering his forces and assets and was continuously counterattacking to hold back the charge of the motor riflemen.

I don't have to tell you how important and how difficult it is under these conditions to maintain control over everything that is happening on the battlefield and to foresee the possible variations in the development of the battle. And at first glance, the unit headquarters was successful in doing that: it was constantly monitoring the situation and clearly reacting to changes. In any event, that is what anyone who had gone into the tent where staff officer Major V. Gavrilov was working would have thought. Under his skillful hand the battle map was in fact changing and the characteristic diagram reflected the heat and turbulence of the battle.

Moreover, when glancing at the map, one had to be happy at the totality of the training battle picture as reflected on it. It provided an exhaustive representation of the weak points in the "enemy's" defensive system, the open flanks and the deployment line for the reserves. Thus the regimental commander had only to carefully consider all of this data when making his decision and success, it would seem, would be assured.

However, I repeat that this is how it seemed at first glance alone. It was later shown that those same irreproachable-looking estimates were not based on information from reconnaissance, which, as is known, all subunits taking part in the battle must carry out continuously. Rather they were based on information obtained from higher headquarters. Moreover, the scouts commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Veselovskiy were operating in the main battle formation and were not involved in collecting information about the "enemy" and terrain.

What can one say about this? As is known, in principle it is entirely possible for higher headquarters to supply its subunits with the intelligence that it has at its disposal. For example, not only in exercises but also in battle itself, a company receives part of this intelligence from battalion headquarters, and the battalion gets it from regimental headquarters, and so forth. But one thing must be stressed: this part only supplements the intelligence that each commander must obtain through his own efforts by conducting direct reconnaissance under all conditions. What has happened is that the more often combat orders for subunit commanders have references to information from higher sources (and reality shows that even now, at the end of the training year, training for company- and battalion-level commanders here and there contains the "insurance" of a surplus of intelligence), the more perceptible are the shortcomings in the work of officers who organize reconnaissance using the forces and assets of combined arms subunits. It turns out that some senior headquarters are providing a very doubtful service to subunit commanders by providing this service.

For example, one can judge where this can lead by this funny incident that I had occasion to witness one day.

After arriving at the training area a senior commander asked the regimental chief of staff to give a report on where the reconnaissance subunit was and what specific mission it was accomplishing at that given moment. The "search" for the scouts went on for quite a long time. However, the question "Where have the scouts gone?" still remains unsolved.

I can imagine what a front-line veteran would say after reading those lines: "In battle without reconnaissance?!"

Yes, it is difficult for anyone who has been in battle to even allow such a thought. I remember the front-line commandment: not a step without reconnaissance! The truth of this has been proven under fire. Battle success to a great degree depends on commanders at all levels obtaining reconnaissance information in a timely manner. When they have had the necessary intelligence at their disposal, commanders and staffs have made the most advisable decisions for the specific situation and have been able to foresee the nature of up-coming combat operations and the development of events. And how many examples are there in the history of war where smaller forces won the battle thanks to the skillful organization of reconnaissance. Moreover, front-line experience shows that tactical reconnaissance, in addition to supporting the combat operations of units and subunits, has successfully resolved missions in favor of operational and even tactical commands.

One could certainly not maintain that people in this regiment do not know the importance of reconnaissance as one of the types of combat support or that they do not teach commanders how to set it up. They understand and teach it. But the question is, how is this done. The experience of the exercises that were held in a number of subunits during the final stage of the training year indicates that there are still many commanders that have not mastered the truth that "battle begins with reconnaissance." And the various types of weaknesses and omissions allowed in setting up reconnaissance lead one to

believe that many officers still have the wrong idea about the essence of this issue. For example, how many times does one run into officers at exercises who feel that it is not very difficult to get information about the enemy in modern battle. And this is indeed a grave error. We know that as countermeasures that the enemy employs increase, the reconnaissance requirements caused by the change in the nature of battle increase.

It is certainly not an easy task to have commanders at all levels develop a thoughtful, serious attitude toward everything associated with setting up reconnaissance. But nonetheless, experience has shown that it is possible to constantly develop a situation in the course of exercises and training that prompts officers to get objectively involved in this important type of combat support.

Unfortunately, this is not being done everywhere. What often happens during the planning phase of an exercise is that reconnaissance issues are deliberately assigned a secondary role. And at times during the exercise itself, as already stated, commanders are put in a situation where there is no need for them to reconnoiter with their own forces. Higher headquarters provides them with all the necessary information ahead of time. And naturally, hypothetical situations that are introduced into such exercises, regardless of how plentiful they are, do not have the necessary effect since there is more than enough initial material, i.e. intelligence information, for the commanders to make their decisions.

As is known, training involving two sides is extremely instructive and also improves reconnaissance training. This makes it possible to have subunits, including reconnaissance elements, operate as closely as possible to actual battle conditions. But not all of our training involves two sides. Take, for example, the case when an element comes in direct contact with the "enemy" and the two sides are simply forced to conduct actual reconnaissance against each other. It is extremely difficult to create all the problems of a combat situation (and this is a necessary condition for conducting reconnaissance) when there is only one element training and resistance is simply symbolic. This is precisely where serious weaknesses are being allowed.

For example, this is what I had occasion to see during tactical training involving combat firing in the battalion commanded by Captain A. Yaresko. In order to give the training combat intensity from the very beginning and as should have been done, march security was set up for the move and duty firing weapons were assigned to watch for aerial targets. Combat reconnaissance patrols were actively operating during the attack. But too much of this was simulated, as the motor riflemen met no resistance from the "enemy."

It is certainly not easy to create the appropriate conditions to train personnel in reconnoitering methods. But it is possible. For example, mock-ups of military equipment may be used, groups of soldiers may be brought in to simulate the "enemy" and preparing the tactical training area in a well-thought out manner helps tremendously. These measures are still not used often enough. And trying to train reconnaissance work outside the reality of near-battle conditions would be like training for mountain warfare on city asphalt. Naturally, since they have not had the appropriate practical

experience, some officers are of the opinion that collecting intelligence on the enemy is strictly the concern of reconnaissance subunits.

The training year is coming to a close. Soldiers in all arms of service are taking the difficult test of military maturity in tactical exercises and at training. One of the primary missions for commanders and staffs is to elicit the necessary lessons from failures, to find unused reserves, to include improving reconnaissance training for personnel in combined arms subunits, and put them into use to increase combat readiness.

12511

CSO: 1801/25

GROUND FORCES

POTAPOV INTERVIEW ON SOVIET TROOPS' DAY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 86 p 1

[Interview with Col Gen Yu. Potapov, chief of the Main Armored Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Lt Col S. Pashayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"Powerful Is the Homeland's Armor"]

[Text] Forty years ago, on 8 September 1946, the combat equipment of the Guards Tank Kantemirov Division passed in review through Red Square. On that day our homeland's capital formally celebrated a new holiday, Tank Troops' Day, for the first time. It was established on 11 July 1946 by an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in commemoration of the outstanding service of the armored and mechanized troops and the tank builders in the Great Patriotic War. Each year since then, on the second Sunday in September, the Soviet people have honored the tank troops, both the fightingmen of today and the valorous veterans, all those who have had a part in the creation and the strengthening of the tank troops.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev, our correspondent, talked with Colonel General Yu. Potapov, Chief of the Main Armored Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, on the eve of Tank Troops' Day.

[Question] Comrade Colonel General, how have these past 40 years been significant for the tank troops?

[Answer] I remember that day well, since I myself was a participant in the memorable September parade. The distance traveled has been enormous, of course. The famous T-34 and KV tanks have been replaced. Having served out their time, they were placed onto granite pedestals as symbols, replaced by even more powerful, faster and more beautiful machines. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers have no doubt seen them at our military parades.

It is not just a matter of equipment, of course. Utilizing the vast experience of the Great Patriotic War, the tank troops have recently continued to develop as the main striking force of the Ground Forces. Their organizational structure has been improved, as have the forms and methods for utilizing them in the battle and the operation in combination with other branches and services of the Armed Forces.

It is worth noting that a fundamentally new class of armored vehicle, our infantry combat vehicle, has come into being during these years. It is superior to similar foreign models in many respects.

[Question] The famous Thirty-Four once set the leading trends in world tank design for many years. Could one say that Soviet science has still not lost its preeminence in this field today?

[Answer] I would answer this way: In the opinion of authoritative specialists, including foreign experts, Soviet tanks continue to be among the most advanced and reliable. The modern tank is an intricate complex of interconnected systems and assemblies providing for highly accurate fire, day or night, in any kind of weather. Powerful armor reliably protects its crew, and its high speed and simplicity of control make it possible to effect extensive and rapid maneuvering of subunits, units and formations. In addition, the tank can operate successfully in the tundra or the desert, in wooded and swampy or mountainous and taiga terrain, cross streams underwater, clear passages through minefields with mine-clearing attachments and dig in without help.

Naturally, the increased complexity of the tank's design makes increased demands of those who operate it. Among other things, the personnel, particularly the officers, must have a thorough understanding of the tank itself. Otherwise, the capabilities incorporated in the machine are simply not realized in its operation.

[Question] What, in your opinion, determines success in the tankmen's combat improvement today?

[Answer] The same thing, I believe, which determines it for motorized riflemen, missilemen and sailors: things are better where organization is most precise and discipline is strongest, where one constantly senses consideration for the individual and concern for the equipment.

Take the Guards Tank Chertov Regiment imeni Marshal of Armored Troops M.Ye. Katukov. The combat training is truly the main and crucial thing there. Personnel in the companies and battalions know how to make efficient use of training time and work conscientiously. The regiment strives persistently to maintain the equipment and weapons in exemplary order, to operate it without accident, to extend periods between repairs and to save fuel and lubricants. The first results of this approach took shape at the end of the winter period, when around 40 percent of the regiment's fightingmen became outstanding in the combat and political training, and more than 80 percent of them became highly rated specialists.

One could name many other military collectives in which the pulse of the times is felt in concrete practical deeds. They include, among others, the units and subunits commanded by officers Yu. Veretenik, A. Ilchenko, Yu. Pakhomov, V. Kozlov, A. Mitrofanov, V. Urmanov and Yu. Sostavnov. The climate of the restructuring and the laws of acceleration governing the nation's life today, however, demand that we not forget about unresolved problems even on holidays. I would point out that the creative approach to the planning and the activation of various types of organizational reserves have already made it possible to markedly improve and intensify the training process. Far from everything possible has yet been done,

however. The situation in a number of units, which lagged behind in the competition during the winter period, continues to be a matter of concern to us. Work is being done there, of course, serious work at that. It is apparently too early to discuss results, however. The final inspection will provide a thorough evaluation.

We have a number of complaints about the quality of training of the graduates of certain military schools and of the level of the practical training in firing and driving on the part of specialists arriving from training units and subunits. There are problems having to do with the reequipping of the training facilities and the creation of proper conditions for servicing and repairing the equipment. We see them and are taking the necessary steps. We would like to see all of this accelerated, of course.

[Question] The Soviet tank troops have a glorious history and remarkable traditions. How are these publicized, and how are the tank troops working on combat readiness today?

[Answer] Both gray-headed veterans and the youth speak with pride of being members of the tank troops. Quite frankly, they have something to be proud of. The tank troops have always performed the most important missions involved in defeating aggressors. At the dawn of Soviet power, armored forces of the young Soviet Republic participated in battles with the interventionists. The Great Patriotic War was a rigorous and thorough test of the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the armored troops. Soviet tankmen demonstrated mass heroism and good combat skill on the battlefields. The massing of tank troops on the crucial sectors increased throughout the war. While around 800 Soviet tanks took part in the fighting at Moscow, more than 1,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces pounded the enemy at Stalingrad, around 3,500 on the Kursk Salient, and more than 6,000 in the storming of Berlin.

The homeland honored highly the tankmen's heroism. More than a thousand of them were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. It was awarded twice to 16 of the most valorous. A total of 250,000 soldiers, NCOs, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals. Tank formations and units which particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting received the Guards title. All six tank armies, 12 tank and 9 mechanized corps, 66 tank and 28 mechanized regiments had the Guards title by the end of the war.

The enormous labor of the tank builders was also highly appreciated. Today's tankmen are also aware of this. They know too that our nation produced twice the amount of weapons and combat equipment produced by Nazi Germany during the war, including more than 102,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces. And they know that more than 9,000 tank builders were awarded orders and medals, that many of them were awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor.

The front-line experience is extensively used in the training and indoctrination of the tankmen. Particular mention should be made of the creation of conditions approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree. The crews learn how to conduct continuous reconnaissance, how to operate boldly and decisively, day or night, how to destroy targets with the first shot or the first round at maximum range. The units and subunits strive constantly to reduce the amount of

time required to put the equipment into a state of combat readiness. Socialist competition, which is gradually being rid of elements of formalism, is playing an increasingly important role in this matter.

The veterans' tradition of courage and heroism is being worthily continued by our fightingmen-and-internationalists, who are making creative use of their know-how and, together with their comrades in arms, the Afghan fightingmen, are inflicting devastating strikes against the enemies of friendly Afghanistan. Personnel of the tank battalion commanded by Captain B. Kolgayev are successfully accomplishing the training tasks and combat missions. Fightingmen of the tank company commanded by Captain V. Silev demonstrate valor and self-control and the ability to skilfully use the weapons and equipment.

Today, in the final phase of the training year, our efforts are directed toward activating all reserves for enhancing the combat skills and rendering a worthy account to the Soviet people of our contribution to the strengthening of the combat capability of the Armed Forces.

As they celebrate Tank Troop's Day, the Soviet people can rightly take pride in their tank troops, the homeland's reliable armored shield.

11499

CSO: 1801/30

GROUND FORCES

REVIEW: 'FORWARD DETACHMENTS IN COMBAT'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Aug 86 p 2

[Review by Army Gen P. Lashchenko, Hero of the Soviet Union, of book "Peredovyye otryady v boyu" [Forward Detachments in Combat] by F. Sverdlov, Voenizdat, 1986, 216 pages; under the rubric "The Commander's Bookshelf": "Operations of the Forward Detachment"]

[Text] The role of forward detachments in combined-arms combat has grown immeasurably in the contemporary situation, in which combat operations have become more mobile and decisive. They can take rapid advantage of nuclear and fire strikes against the enemy and help to increase the overall pace of the offensive. In a defense, they can receive the enemy strike and provide the most advantageous conditions for operations by the main forces.

Manuals on the employment of forward detachments cannot cover all matters pertaining to their use, a knowledge of which is essential in the preparation and training of the troops. It is there important that these matters are discussed in the literature--the book "Peredovyye otryady v boyu," among others.

It considers the role of advanced detachments in modern combined-arms combat and the circumstances in which they can operate, based on the development of Soviet military art and taking into account the improvement of the combat equipment and military equipment and changes which have been made in the organizational structure in recent years. The author sets forth an expedient procedure for organizing and effecting interaction between forward detachments and the main forces and tactical airborne landing forces, considers the operations of forward detachments using modern weapons, including operations under special conditions, and provides certain recommendations for organizing the operations of forward detachments in the future.

The employment of forward detachments of rifle and tank formations during various periods of the Great Patriotic War is analyzed in the first part of the book. It stresses what is instructive and important in the contemporary situation. Explaining the basic principles for using advanced detachments in modern combined-arms combat, the author describes the most characteristic features and principles, as well as views existing in various armies on the use of forward detachments. The book describes the combat missions of forward detachments and demonstrates their most efficient composition. It considers in detail possible combat operations

of forward detachments in an offensive battle, in both the tactical and operational zones of the enemy's defense, as well as in the forcing of rivers, in a mountain offensive, in the landing of naval landing forces, and interacting with tactical airborne landing forces. The author cites a considerable number of specific examples and offers recommendations on actions to be taken by the commanders of forward detachments while directing them during the period of organizing and conducting combat operations, including the adoption of the decision, the organization of interaction, the conduct of an offensive or a defense. The recommendations for conducting combat in ordinary conditions and in mountains deserve attention.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that the author has not taken into full account trends in the development of conventional weapons in the armies of the USA and certain other nations of the aggressive NATO bloc. These involve homing missiles, bombs and shells, high-precision weapons, reconnaissance/strike systems and high-powered charges providing for highly effective target destruction and making it possible to put the "fire and forget" principle into effect. The book should have explained the impact of these weapons upon the combat operations of forward detachments.

Overall, the book will be a useful aid for army and navy officers and for students and cadets at military educational institutions.

11499

CSO: 1801/254

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

INSPECTION HIGHLIGHTS WEAKNESSES IN SAM BATTALION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 86 p 1

[Report by Col G. Ivanov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "The Test: Why Did the SAM Battalion's Fightingmen Not Pass It During the Inspection?"]

[Text] The practical inspection suddenly began. The SAM battalion in which Captain N. Krylov is chief of staff was to take part in tactical exercises. Two years before, the missilemen had performed a similar mission with excellence. How would they do on the test now, with a new commander?

Majors V. Zhuravskiy and V. Nesterenko, officers from higher headquarters, observed the practical exercise with pencil in hand, as they say. In his area, Major Zhuravskiy studied the performance of fightingmen in the launching battery headed by Captain V. Isayev. The previous year it had been judged the best in the unit. The members of the launching crew were expected to exhibit a high level of combat training this time as well.

At a signal from the inspector, the fightingmen began positioning the missile on the guide. At first they performed skillfully, without error. Then Major Zhuravskiy introduced what would appear to be an ordinary situation: "Gas!" Delays immediately developed in the work of the crews. It was apparent that the specialists were not accustomed to working in the protective gear. They performed the operations slowly. Most important, however, was the fact that they understood one another and interacted poorly. When the members of the launching crew began securing the missile to the guide beam, uncoordinated actions by Private Yu. Pitsik and other crew members caused it to slam into the stop. Had this been a live missile and not a practice one, the launching would have been impossible.

This showed that the crew was not adequately prepared to perform in the kind of complex situation full of unexpected problems which ordinarily develops in the course of live firings. But perhaps this was just a troublesome hitch. Major Zhuravskiy did not want to believe that the once-outstanding battalion was giving such a poor performance. The officer also took into account the fact that there were many new men in the subunit.

Sometime later the launching crews were assigned a new mission. This time they were operating in limited visibility. Once again they only earned a satisfactory rating with difficulty. Furthermore, it was not a new man, but Junior Sergeant G. Krasin, who committed an error in an ordinary situation.

Events followed approximately the same scenario at another training station, where Major Nesterenko was testing the missilemen's ability to check out the functioning of the equipment and prepare it for a mission. Captain S. Yurachev took the test first. He handled it successfully.

Major Nesterenko suggested that Senior Lieutenant V. Komakha, the interception controller, be tested in working with the equipment.

After a certain amount of time, the young officer reported that the equipment was ready for combat. Major Nesterenko looked at his stopwatch. Excellent time. But what about quality? It was not nearly so good. An inspection showed that Senior Lieutenant Komakha had omitted an operation without which it is impossible to accurately assess the operational readiness of the radar.

This alone gave the inspector the right to draw a certain conclusion. Like Major Zhuravskiy, however, Nesterenko did not make any hasty evaluations. He talked with the senior lieutenant and tested his knowledge of the operating principles of the equipment. He was forced to say that the interception controller's level of professional training did not measure up to his rating of specialist 2nd class.

Lieutenant A. Abdurakhmanov also failed the test and received a "two." Certain other battalion officers demonstrated inadequate knowledge.

Just how did this happen?

A study of the organization of combat training in the battalion provided an answer to this question. Unfortunately, it had been conducted with frequent violations of the established requirements, and the crews had drilled in simplified situations.

Nor did the party organization, headed by Captain Yurachev, its secretary, demonstrate proper principle or persistence in striving to make the combat training the main and determining factor in the subunit's life.

When we contemplate the causes of the battalion's lowered performance in the combat training, it would obviously be appropriate to ask: "Just where was the attention of unit headquarters directed"? Let us say right off that the battalion has not been deprived of attention by the leadership. Lieutenant Colonels V. Rudiyevev and Yu. Fadin, Major M. Grakhovskiy and other officers spend time in the subunit. Experience has shown, however, that they do not always delve deep enough into its problems or consider specific questions. This is indicated, for example, by the schedule of periodic maintenance work on the equipment "sent down" to the subunit, by the omissions which had to be rectified in it in the subunit.

Or take the following incident. While we were there, Major M. Grakhovskiy, chief of the unit's missile and artillery weapons service, arrived in the battalion. He came to help the soldiers, we thought. It turned out that he had come to send Captain Yurachev to another subunit, although there was no need for this. And this was during the battalion's inspection! It was only the principled position taken by Majors Zhuravskiy and Nesterenko which forced Grakhovskiy to alter his decision.

One must give some thought to the fact that the chiefs' lack of demandingness of themselves gives rise not only to "departmentalism," but also to passivity and attitudes of dependency. And this ultimately affects their subordinates and the state of the training process. Unfortunately, not all of the regiments here have yet thoroughly understood this. When we continued the discussion of the causes of the decline in the battalions' performance in the combat training, some officers said, with Majors Zhuravskiy and Nesterenko in mind:

"The purpose of their work is not so much to inspect as to help us...."

Yes, officers from higher headquarters do a lot of work here. One should not rely on their help alone, however. Especially since the purpose of their present visit was to test (!) the battalion's combat readiness. Otherwise, what do we have: a situation in which inspectors should have the worst headache because of omissions in the combat training? Frankly, this is a strange attitude.

We can see that the surprise inspection of fightingmen in the SAM battalion brought out problems in the state of combat training in the unit as a whole. They must be resolved without procrastination, from the standpoint of today's demands.

11499

CSO: 1801/254

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

PILOT GROUNDED AFTER LACK OF DISCIPLINE CAUSES FLIGHT INCIDENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Sep 86 p 2

[Report by Maj N. Tsvetov, Red Banner Volga Military District, under the rubric "Regulations--the Law of Military Life": "Once, During a Flight..."]

[Text] The commander's order, the manuals and military regulations constitute an immutable law governing our military life. While still in school the future officers understand the fact that it is inadmissible to violate regulations or overstep the bounds marked off in an order. We still find people who overstep those bounds, however, even though they know the laws governing the military service. Those officers most frequently lack a sense of self-discipline and self-control.

...The helicopter was flying at an extremely low altitude. It was piloted by Senior Lieutenant R. Galimov. The mission involved no special difficulty for the airman: a check flight along a route and practice in maneuvering techniques. Galimov was to detect "enemy" air defense facilities and penetrate the zone covered.

He had performed such exercises more than once. Since this was a check flight, however, the seat on the right in the cockpit was occupied by Senior Lieutenant K. Vyskrebentsev, senior flight instructor, who was to test Galimov's ability to operate while counteracting air defenses. The rotary-wing machine hugged the ground and swept over fields and forests. Landmarks changed rapidly.

The airfield with the radar tracking the flight of Galimov's crew was left far behind. He decided to take advantage of this. Assuming that the quality of the flight would not be checked from the objective control equipment, the senior lieutenant dropped to an impermissibly low altitude in violation of flight safety requirements.

"Commander, we are flying very low. We could strike an obstacle," reported Captain M. Mishastyy, the airborne aircraft technician.

"I see that. Everything will be fine," Galimov replied.

And what about the flight instructor? He too could see very well that the officer had overstepped the flight boundary. He directed his comment not to Galimov but to the airborne technician, however. Don't distract the pilot from flying the helicopter.

"Had I known how it would end," Senior Lieutenant Vyskreventsev would say later, "I would not have permitted it. At the time I decided that since Galimov was a veteran pilot, he was taking a justified risk."

The recklessness and hooliganism in the air ended with Senior Lieutenant Galimov failing to control the helicopter and having a serious near-miss.

The incident involving Senior Lieutenants Galimov and Vyskrebentsev could not be placed into the category of "errors in training methods." A commission from higher headquarters thoroughly investigated the incident. It named a personal lack of responsibility on the part of the officers as one of the main causes of the near-miss. Both of the airmen were severely punished and grounded. And although this incident has already been discussed in one of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA articles dealing with problems of flight safety, it makes sense to return to it and look at it from the following aspect.

Why did the senior lieutenants violate flight discipline? Why did their sense of self-discipline not come into play? I believe that these questions can be answered by gaining a better understanding of the way the service is organized in the air squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Khvalgin, in which the two officers serve. Everyone there pays lip service to the rigid, wise and tested fact that discipline in the air is shaped on the ground. This is frequently discussed at service conferences, party and Komsomol meetings. A different, unspoken belief that an airman can permit himself to relax on the ground has taken root among the airmen in the subunit, however. Regulations are regulations, they reason, and life is something else. But then he who permits himself indulgences on the ground engages in them also in the air.

While still cadets at the military flight school, Galimov and Vyskrebentsev had seen that in Lieutenant Colonel Khvalgin's squadron the flight instructors could permit themselves to depart with impunity from the code of military life. Upon arriving in the squadron after completing the school, they saw that nothing had changed. Captain V. Medvedev went around out of uniform and wearing nonregulation footwear, for example, and the commanders looked the other way: "This is not the main thing. The important thing is how the officer performs the combat training tasks and what kind of results he achieves in the military work."

Captain Medvedev once arrived for work following a long drinking spree. No attention was given to this fact in the squadron. He had not consumed alcohol on the job. Why make a fuss and air dirty linen in public? The squadron commander and his deputies used their usual excuse: If the incident is reported through the chain of command, we will be held to blame all the same. They will say that we have neglected the indoctrinational work. The error was realized in the subunit only when Medvedev consumed alcohol on the job.

The anything-goes climate which reigned there could not help affecting the conduct of the airmen in the air. The first warning was a near-miss in the air resulting from Captain Bilogrud's personal lack of discipline. He hauled some people on a helicopter without authorization from his superiors. And it was the same old story. The officer was disciplined, and that was the end of it. The commanders "forgot" about the incident so thoroughly that soon after it occurred, Captain Bilogrud's name appeared on the list of those excelling in the combat and political training.

Galimov and Vyskrebentsev developed as officers in that climate. No one in the squadron taught them to assess their actions self-critically. No one held them strictly accountable for "petty" deviations from the regulations. And so the young officers became convinced that they could get by with anything. We know the results: the pilots ultimately committed gross violations of flight safety requirements. The officers learned a hard lesson.

Today, when considerably greater demandingness is being applied to everyone, no matter what his position, the matter of the officer's personal discipline is increasingly moving to the fore. The pilot, the person who takes the combat aircraft into the air and personally answers for the precise and accurate performance of the combat mission and for the life of the crew, must learn to be particularly demanding of himself. One could cite numerous examples in which pilots who are demanding of themselves have achieved and continue to achieve excellent performance in the air because of just that--rigid self-discipline. These include, among others, Majors V. Tolmachev and N. Gerasimov, flight instructors first-class and commanders of excellent flights. Their subordinates, Captains A. Nikulin, S. Ustinov and A. Ruda, also pilots first-class, and other airmen of my acquaintance are on a level with them. Incidentally, all of them serve in the same regiment with those who committed the near-misses in the air. They serve in another squadron, though, the one commanded by Major L. Skubenko.

A completely different moral climate has been created there. The subunit commander and his deputies study the military regulations a great deal and strictly see to it that they are absolutely adhered to. A great deal is done there to see that the spirit of regulation demandingness permeates all of the life and work of the squadron's fightingmen. And this work produces good results. The squadron is an excellent one and has led in the socialist competition year after year. It is entrusted with the most responsible missions. The airmen there strictly observe the flight laws. The facts that the subunit has no near-misses in the air, that gross violations of military discipline have been eliminated and that a purposeful campaign is conducted against so-called "petty" deviations from regulations are firmly interlinked.

The path to the self-discipline which prevents airmen from crossing a forbidden border under any pretext begins on the ground, with absolute observance of the regulations. In conclusion, I would like to stress the fact that the restructuring and the acceleration in the improvement of the combat training process proceed more rapidly where precise regulation order is maintained.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

BRIEFS

NIGHT BOMBING EXERCISE--Krasnoznamenny Turkestanskiy Military District--
During a tactical flight exercise the squadron commanded by Military Pilot
1st Class Lieutenant Colonel N. Izolevich, was assigned the mission of
making a bombing strike on a range located in the mountains. Performance
of the mission was complicated by the fact that the flight had to be
accomplished at maximum range. At the appointed time the squadron took
off. The flight took place mainly over mountain ranges, where the natural
distortion of radio signals created further difficulties in keeping to
the assigned flight path. But high proficiency and skill in exploiting
the capabilities built into the aircraft equipment aided the fliers to
arrive on target precisely on time. Maneuvering followed, and the bomb
dropped by Officer Izolevich hit the target. Following their squadron
commander's example, Majors S. Gorshkov and V. Stovba and Captain Ye. Petrov
turned in an excellent performance. [By Senior Lieutenant G. Sharunov]
[Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 86 p 1] 12697

SPECIAL TROOPS

CHERNOBYL: PIPELAYERS PROVIDE WATER FOR DECONTAMINATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by Reserve Col B. Lyapkalo, freelance correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the rubric "At the Chernobyl AES": "Pipelayers"]

[Text] As a rule, pipelaying subunits [podrazdeleniye] service field stores of fuel and lubricants and deliver fuel to vehicle fuelling posts. During the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES they were also called on to supply water. It had to be supplied to sanitary treatment posts, for washing motor vehicles, to shower and laundry subunits, and to the concrete unloading station. The daily consumption of water was enormous. It required virtually round-the-clock operation of hundreds of tank trucks. This task was then assigned to the pipelaying company commanded by Capt A. Yemayev.

These troops laid about 50 km of pipe in a short period. They set up mobile pumping facilities.

"We are now supplying water to the installations round the clock," stated Capt Yemayev. "The duty shift is taking care of that. An emergency group is involved in eliminating any malfunctions."

While we were in the subunit, that group, which was headed by the platoon commander Senior Warrant Officer Movchan, had just gone out to the line. They had to repair mechanical damage done to the pipeline by a heavy tracked vehicle.

By the way, Senior Warrant Officer Movchan's subordinates were in competition with the platoon commanded by Sr Lt Vasilii Ivashchenko. They were taking turns in the race for first place. The comrades had recently congratulated Sr Lt Ivashchenko on winning the competition for the week.

The pipelaying company is one of the best rear-area subunits in the district. It has achieved high indicators for combat training and for successfully eliminating the consequences of the accident at the AES. Capt Yemayev deserves much credit for this. He has had much experience organizing work under the most difficult conditions. He performed his international duty in Afghanistan, and earned the Combat Service Medal [Za boyevyye zaslugi]. Under Yemayev's command the company has several times distinguished itself in tactical

exercises.

The company commander and his senior commanders, when speaking of the pipelayers' combat training, continually mentioned the name of the subunit's first sergeant, Warrant Officer A. Bayakov. Delivering food to the pumping stations, and organizing living conditions -- all this is dealt with by communist Warrant Officer Bayakov.

In the front line of the tent camp the shift going on duty is in formation. Capt Yemayev briefly sums up the work results for the current day, updates the details of the impending tasks, and dispatches the specialists to their places of work.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

ARMY PAPER ASSESSES U.S. PACIFIC STRATEGY

PM140921 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Nov 86 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "Observer's Notes": "Admiral Hays' Fairytales"]

[Text] It seems that the recent visit to a number of Asian countries by Pentagon chief Weinberger and the statements he made there were essentially the start of a major propaganda campaign aimed at scaring the Asian states with the "Soviet military threat" and discrediting the USSR's peace initiatives aimed at strengthening the region's security. The local press and TV and radio programs, as if to order, have been featuring certain "experts" who have continually contended that the only "salvation" for the Asian countries is for them to be involved in U.S. global strategy.

Ranking Pentagon officials are also participating most actively in this propaganda pandemonium. Thus, for instance, Admiral Hays, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, gave an interview to Japanese, South Korean, Thai, and Australian journalists. In that interview he made no bones about describing the "threatening growth of Soviet military might in Asia."

But however practiced Pentagon generals and admirals may be in anti-Soviet slander, there is now a growing realization in the Asian states about just what actually threatens the region. The Asian countries' alarm was probably expressed in concentrated form by the Indonesian newspaper SUARA KARYA, which front-paged a picture of a sinister nuclear mushroom cloud and cited figures attesting that most inhabitants of the continent would die in literally the first few minutes of a nuclear conflict. Furthermore, the countries of the region can clearly see where this nuclear threat comes from. That is why the movement to get rid of U.S. military bases is becoming more and more widespread in the Philippines. That is why South Korean students clash with the police, demanding an end to the U.S. military presence.

More than 40 years ago, striving to scare the entire planet with their superweapons, the Americans condemned the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to nuclear cremation. And since then U.S. strategists have repeatedly examined the possibility of using these weapons in the region: against the peoples of Korea, China, and Vietnam. Since the end of the forties the U.S. bases on the Asian continent have constantly figured in

Pentagon plans as springboards for delivering a nuclear strike against the USSR.

Today the United States has one sinister scheme in mind in siting nuclear weapons in Asia: hampering social progress and turning the clock back. According to foreign press reports, the 360,000-strong grouping of U.S. troops sited in the region holds more than 2,000 nuclear munitions. There are the 1,000 bombs, landmines, and mines in South Korea. There are the nuclear bombs fitted to warplanes on the carriers of the 7th Fleet. Finally, there are the 400 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles.

Of course, all this enormous power has by no means been assembled to provide defense against the "Soviet threat"--however much Weinberger, Hays, and company may try to prove otherwise. According to existing doctrine, the Japanese ASAHI newspaper alleges, the Pentagon is striving to surround Soviet territory on land with military bases and at sea with carrier groups and ships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, thereby creating the potential to deliver nuclear first strike against Soviet targets.

The scenarios for U.S. troop maneuvers, which are conducted almost continuously near our country's eastern borders, convince us that the newspaper is not far from the truth. While Adm Hays was scaring the Asian states with the "Soviet military threat," the troops under his command were rehearsing plans for combat operations against the Soviet Union on Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido. U.S. units and military equipment were transferred there from Hawaii, the Philippines, and South Korea. Nuclear-capable warplanes based both in Japan and in the south of the Korean Peninsula took part in the maneuvers. Warships from the 7th Fleet were concentrated near Hokkaido.

Naturally, when faced with such aggressive preparations on the part of the United States, the Soviet Union cannot but be concerned about safeguarding its own security and that of its friends and allies. That was why medium-range missiles have been sited in the Asian part of our country. But at the same time the Soviet Union persistently seeks genuine security for all on the path of eliminating nuclear weapons.

That is why in his Vladivostok speech this summer M. S. Gorbachev resolutely demanded that the way to a proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons in Asia be barred. This line was continued at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. There, as is well known, the Soviet Union made new proposals on the question of medium-range missiles in Asia. And accords have already been worked out to the effect that the USSR will maintain 100 warheads for medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country. The United States will be allowed to have the same number on its territory. And it was Washington's fault, not Moscow's, that this historic step in the sphere of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons in Asia was not taken. The United States preferred the full-scale continuation of the "star wars" program. Incidentally, this program may add a new threat to the nuclear danger already existing in Asia. A threat from space this time. The Pentagon is most

vigorously deploying in the area infrastructure elements for waging "star wars." Furthermore, active steps are being taken to include the Asian and Pacific countries in this adventurist program. At the same time the U.S. allies have already had suggested to them the idea of the creation of some kind of "regional defense initiative."

The facts convince us that Washington is not seeking security for itself and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Enticing some countries with all kinds of military groupings and threatening others with a nuclear cudgel, the United States is striving to establish its undivided hegemony in the region.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

DISCUSSION OF U.S. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

Moscow VESTNIK PROTIVVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian No 7, Jul 86 p 76

[Article by Maj S. Leonov, candidate of technical sciences: "Directed Energy Weapons" (Footnote 1) (From material in the foreign press)]

[Text] In their militaristic preparations the leading countries of the NATO bloc, and primarily the United States, place great hopes in the development of the latest types of weapons, one of which is beam [luchevoye] weapons. Western military specialists believe that in the near future these will be effectively utilized for air defense and for strike systems based in space.

By beam weapons foreign specialists mean weapons that make it possible to concentrate energy in a narrow beam capable of destroying various targets. They are therefore also known as directed energy weapons. Their main types are laser and beam [puchkovoye].

American specialists believe that so-called high-energy lasers that generate electromagnetic waves with a pulse power of more than 20 kW are particularly effective. The foreign press has reported that the maximum pulse power obtained in the United States during tests of a ground-based system was in excess of 2 MW.

Most promising for employment in the military, in the opinion of foreign specialists are chemical lasers, which have two important advantages over other types of lasers. The first is that the energy released as the result of chemical fuel reactions can be more easily supplied to a laser device than electrical energy. This is extremely important under actual battle conditions. The second is that the relatively small dimensions of chemical lasers make it easy to use them in military systems based in space, where weight and size limitations are often decisive.

Some American specialists have high hopes for utilizing lasers that employ free electrons, as well as X-ray lasers. The operating element in the former is a beam of free electrons moving in a magnetic field, the vector of which changes direction in space. The proponents of this approach maintain that lasers of this kind make it possible to achieve radiation outputs that exceed by several megawatts the maximum theoretically attainable by conventional lasers.

Foreign specialists believe that there are two main types of tasks that can be performed by tactical laser weapons: knocking out the so-called sensory systems of enemy targets, and inflicting mechanical damage on military targets. In the first case a "blinded" missile is thrown off its prescribed course, and may even explode aloft without ever reaching the target. As for the infliction of mechanical damage, a high-intensity laser beam may, for example, knock out all the on-board automatic equipment of a missile or its warhead, or cause the fuel tanks to explode.

According to information in the foreign press, the United States is conducting studies in the field of developing the technology of strategic laser weapons based on the ground and in space (under the Triad program). American specialists believe that these weapons can be used in an echeloned ABM system with space facilities that the U. S. administration intends to deploy in the context of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. In the opinion of American specialists ground-based lasers located at 10 points on the surface of the Earth will be able to intercept ICBMs in all sectors of their flight trajectories.

According to information in the foreign press, the United States is developing laser weapons to be based in space under the Triad program, which consists of three parts: the Alpha subprogram to directly develop a laser device in the infrared band with an output of more than 5 MW; the Lodge subprogram, which provides for demonstration testing of an optical system for beam guidance (it has been proposed to fabricate the main control mirror, which is 4 m in diameter, by 1987); and the Talon Gold subprogram, which is to fabricate and test a pinpoint guidance system.

The destructive effect of laser weapons, according to data in the foreign press, is based on the impact on the target attacked of concentrated beams of charged or neutral particles (neutrons, gamma rays, etc.) having the energy of several hundred megaelectron volts. American specialists link the combat employment of beam weapons primarily with their use in the final echelon for intercepting ICBMs by an ABM system. In their opinion, these weapons will be able to effectively destroy the remaining missiles after entering the atmosphere by melting their warheads as a result of the impact of a directed particle beam. It is expected that the feasibility of the concept of building these weapons can be demonstrated by 1990.

Aggressive U. S. circles are intensively pursuing the work of producing new types of weapons in order to secure themselves military superiority over the USSR. History has frequently demonstrated, however, that such plans are untenable.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

JOINT U.S.-EGYPTIAN EXERCISE 'THREATENS' LIBYA

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov under the rubric "Neoglobalism--Doctrine of Robbery":
"Sights on Libya"]

[Text] Washington is preparing a new armed attack on the Libyan Republic. This is the conclusion one can draw from the extremely disturbing events taking place in the southern Mediterranean. The first phase has just concluded of the joint U.S.-Egyptian exercises which were carried out in the immediate proximity of the Gulf of Sidra. Taking part in them on the American side were the ships of the Sixth Fleet, including the carrier Forrestal, carrier aircraft, and marines. Cruising in the same area was still another group of U.S. fighting ships headed by the carrier America. And hurrying across the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean was still a third group headed by the carrier John F. Kennedy.

The Pentagon is attempting to pass off the naval concentration in the southern Mediterranean and the maneuvers carried out there as "normal ship movements" and "normal alert exercises." But here is evidence from the newspaper WALL STREET JOURNAL, which is close to U.S. military circles: "All this is aimed at collecting forces for launching, if required, a rapid punitive strike against Libya." The paper cites the already designated targets of this strike: Libyan oil terminals and other economic facilities of vital importance to the country.

Information leaked to the press makes it possible to get an overall picture of Washington's anti-Libyan preparations. They have apparently concluded in the U.S. capital that the earlier -- April -- attack on Libya by U.S. aircraft was not effective enough, and are now planning, in the event of launching a new such strike from the north, to support it with "additional actions" from other directions. Hence, the already noted suspicious activity to the south of Libya. This began shortly after General Lawson, the deputy chief of staff of U.S. armed forces in Europe was in Chad on a secret mission. It is assumed that during talks with representatives of the Njamena regime and the French command the general discussed the coordination of joint anti-Libyan operations, which could even include the transport of U.S. troops to Chad.

Another U.S. military mission paid a secret visit to Egypt. According to information in the Cairo newspaper ASH SHAAB, it came to an agreement with

Egyptian leaders to hold major military exercises in September and October of this year under the code name Bright Star on the territory of this Arab country, which borders Libya. The paper indicated that about 25,000 military personnel would take part in them, mainly from the U.S. rapid deployment forces, and possibly with troop units from Great Britain and France. Unquestionably, the holding of such a militaristic demonstration so close to Libya's eastern border can only aggravate the situation in that region.

But, of course, we cannot leave out of the reckoning Zionist Israel -- that "strategic ally" of Washington. It could hardly be a coincidence that at that very time an impressive military delegation from Tel Aviv was in the United States. Its talks were being held exclusively in the Pentagon. About what? It was officially announced that they were about plans for the production of the Lavi, Israeli's latest combat aircraft. But who would believe that the representatives of the two military departments were not agreeing, as they have often done in the past, on joint military operations, this time against Libya.

The course being pursued by the United States regarding Libya shows that the U.S. administration is stubbornly continuing to rely on a policy of force and expansion of tension as a means of imposing its hegemonistic plans and attaining its global goals. It is again trying to frighten the Libyan Republic, encroach on the sovereignty of the peoples of that region, and threaten the security of the Mediterranean as a whole. And Washington does not even bother to invent any new pretexts for "teaching" Libya. They are again sounding the alarm over the supposed "Libyan terrorism", which, of course, must be halted. It is time indeed to end it. Not Tripoli's mythical "terrorism," but the completely genuine banditism of Washington.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

VINOGRADOV ON JAPANESE DEFENSE WHITE PAPER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Aug. 86 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov under the rubric "A Rejoinder": "When They Want the 'Ceiling' To Fall In"]

[Text] The Japanese Diet has approved the latest "White Paper on Defense," prepared by the Japan Defense Agency (UNO). When they read it, Japanese journalists noted that, according to the data cited, the nation is in tenth place with respect to level of military allocations. This fact surprised them, at the very least, since it is well known that Japan's military budget has been growing from year to year at a rate within the means of few developed nations. And in fact, when the correspondents expressed their doubts to representatives of the Japan Defense Agency, the latter hastened to make an "adjustment." They admitted that they had used the figures from a similar "White Paper" from 3 years ago, and promised to make a correction.

By using the obsolete figures, some people in Tokyo clearly wanted to hide from the public in both their own and other nations the rapid growth of outlays for militaristic programs. The curious thing, however, is that while not hesitating to transfer figures from the old "White Paper" into the new one, the authors managed to "lose" the part about limiting the growth of military allocations to 1 percent of the gross national product. Unlike past editions, this one says nothing about a "ceiling" on the Japanese military budget.

This is an extremely noteworthy fact. Remember that the so-called "rule of 1 percent of the gross national product" was defined 10 years ago and has been observed by all Japanese governments since then. Recently, however, an equally steady attack has been waged against that rule in order to breach it. Suffice it to say that more than 3.3 trillion yen has been put at the disposal of the Japan Defense Agency for the current fiscal year. This astronomical sum fails to reach the "1-percent ceiling" by only seven one-thousandths of a percent!

We would point out that this is the first year of the current plan for building up Japan's militaristic might, which covers the period extending to the year 1990. Under it the "self-defense forces," which is which the powerful Japanese army is called in Tokyo, will receive, among other things, 60 F-15 interceptors, 50 P-3C ASW aircraft, dozens of helicopters, and submarines and surface ships. Implementation of the 5-year program is to cost 19 trillion yen. The specialists have

calculated that its realization "in full" will mean that the current "1-percent ceiling" on military allocations will certainly collapse, and along with it, the last formal restriction on the path of Japan's unrestrained militarization.

Is this not why not a word is said about it in the current "White Paper on Defense"?

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

PORTUGAL'S ROLE IN NATO BASING, DEPLOYMENTS EXAMINED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Valeriy Volkov, Lisbon, under the rubric "We Answer the Reader": "Where the Azores and Madeira Are"]

[Text] Reader Yu. Kashin of the Moscow area asks what the term "strategic triangle" in the Atlantic means.

The advantageous geographic location of Portugal, situated on the western shore of the Atlantic, has drawn the attention of NATO and Pentagon strategists for several decades. Particular importance is attached to the so-called "strategic triangle." By this term is meant the continental part of the nation and the Azores Archipelago and Madeira Islands in the Atlantic.

The local press states that within the "West's collective defense" system Portugal is assigned the unique role of an "air and naval platform" for carrying out operations in Europe, in the Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic. There are NATO air bases (Montijo, Monte-Real, Cortegas) on Portugal's territory, and an air base at Beja is leased to the FRG. Military depots and fuel dumps are scattered over various regions of the nation. The greatest importance is attached to the Azores Archipelago, however, which has been a part of America's "planned defense" system since 1943. An agreement was signed between Lisbon and Washington back in 1946, under which the USA began building Lajes Air Force Base on Terceira Island. The agreement on the use of that base was signed in 1951 and was subsequently extended several times, the last time being in December 1983.

Calling the Azores an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Atlantic, the American experts assign them the role of a strong point for moving subunits of the Rapid Deployment Force to Europe, the Near East and other regions. During the crises in the Near East in 1958 and 1973 and during the NATO nations' interventionist action in Zaire's Shaba Province in 1978, the Lajes base was used as a transshipment site for delivering Green Berets to the hot spots.

Today, the Pentagon is facing the Portuguese with the issue of expanding it, deploying advanced radar equipment there, building additional oil storage facilities and increasing the number of military personnel there, which already total around 2,000 men.

Underscoring the "substantial role" role played by Portugal in NATO and Pentagon plans, official Washington would like to bind that nation even more tightly to its militaristic preparations. In connection with this, plans are being hatched up for building a large NATO naval and air base on the island of Porto Santo in the Madeira Archipelago, as well as a large radar station for tracking artificial Earth satellites in the southern continental part of Portugal. This station would be under the direct authority of the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Its construction will be directly connected with the U.S. President's notorious Strategic Defense Initiative.

A recently ended visit to Washington by the nation's Prime Minister A. Cavaco Silva, the Portuguese press believes, is evidence that Portugal is being further drawn into the orbit of U.S. military preparations. According to the journalists, questions of bilateral military collaboration occupied a "prominent place" in the talks which the Prime Minister conducted in the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA. This has evoked lively debate in the press and in Portugal's political circles.

Patriotic-minded circles believe that Portugal's membership in NATO cannot limit the independent nature of the nation's foreign policy and must not mean that it follows obediently in the wake of the current U.S. Administration's militaristic course. A statement by the Portuguese Communist Party states that this journey could be a new step in the direction of drawing Lisbon into the orbit of Washington's global plans and serve as a pretext for even greater interference by the USA in the nation's internal affairs.

Broad sections of the public are criticizing Portugal's further involvement in the military preparations. They demand the elimination of foreign military bases on Portuguese territory.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CHARACTERISTICS OF S. AFRICAN HELICOPTER--The weekly FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL has reported on-flight tests in the Republic of South Africa of a test model of the first South-African-produced combat helicopter, called the KhN-1 Alpha [photo not reproduced]. The helicopter's basic combat features are the following: maximum speed 213 km/h; cruising speed 195 km/h; rate of climb 300 m/min; combat range 275 km. These figures are expected to be about 10-percent lower in the conditions of the Republic of South Africa, where a significant portion of the territory is considerably above sea level. The Alpha helicopter has a fuselage of semi-monocoque design. The crew consists of a pilot and a gunner-operator. Its main armaments are a 20mm automatic cannon mounted beneath the cockpit and aimed by means of a sight mounted on the operator's helmet, and guided anti-tank rocket projectiles. Target search and guidance of the anti-tank guided rockets will be effected by means of a sight mounted above the rotor. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Aug 86 p 3] 11499

VISIT OF NIGERIAN VETERANS--A delegation of leaders of the Nigerian Legion was in the USSR from 20 to 29 September at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for War Veterans. It consisted of S. Muazu, Chairman of the Nigerian Legion, E. Esiobu, Legion General Secretary, and Major A. Musa, head of the Directorate for War Veteran Affairs of the Nigerian Ministry of Defense. During the visit the Nigerian Legion delegation met with A. Maresyev, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Committee for War Veterans, K. Mazurov, Deputy Chairman of the SKVV [Soviet Committee for War Veterans], A. Malov, Responsible Secretary of the SKVV, and R. Korniyenko, Chairman of the International Commission of the Committee for Ties With Veteran Organizations of Liberated Nations. Delegation members laid a wreath at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the Grave of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall, and visited the city of Baku, where they laid a wreath at the 26 Baku Commissars Memorial and learned about the work of the Baku Section of the SKVV. Meetings between the Nigerian delegation and SKVV representatives took place in a climate of friendship and mutual understanding. The parties exchanged work experience and discussed the development of relations and cooperation between the Nigerian Legion and the Soviet Committee for War Veterans. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 86 p 3] 11499

HAWK MISSILE ACCIDENT NOTED--There has been another serious accident in the FRG involving three American Hawk missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads. A tractor hauling the missiles overturned in the city of Wurzburg. It was only a matter of luck that no one was injured. The area of the accident was cordoned off by reinforced details of American servicemen and policemen of the Federal Republic. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Oct 86 p 3] 11499

CSO: 1801/21

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

TRIBE ROUTES PAKISTANI CAMP--Kabul 17 November TASS--An armed detachment of the Pashtoon Afridi tribe routed a camp of Pakistani volunteers in the Shahmah area in the northwestern border province of Pakistan and captured arms and ammunition stockpiled in the camp. Reporting on that, the BAKHTAR AGENCY points to the stepped up struggle of independence tribes against the attempts of the Islamabad regime at turning the area inhabited by the Pashtoons into a base of armed provocations against neighbour Afghanistan. Over the past few days, detachments of the tribes launched several strikes against the camps of Afghan counter-revolutionary gangs in the southern Waziristan area inflicting great damage to the counter-revolutionaries in manpower and materiel. The Pakistani authorities retaliated by jailing 25 chiefs and elders of the Baluzai tribe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1121 GMT 17 Nov 86 LD] /12913

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